Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War

[WotanArgead]

Hi WotanArgead, there will be an update about Yugoslavia, although not for a while, given that there are other things that are taking priority at the moment. Their relations with the Soviet Union have definitely warmed up a lot, but there's no chance of them joining the Warsaw Pact or anything like that, since I can't see Tito giving up control over the USSR's armed forces.

With regards to the Space Race, I need to do a lot more research and I'm wary of giving an answer that will reveal just how ignorant I am of the technical aspects of space travel and the like.
Interesting. I was under the impression that chocolate in the Soviet Union had a lower cocoa level, although I may be wrong (in NZ we only define things as chocolate above a certain percentage). But yes, you're right on this point.

I think that you need to contact the SpaceGeek user. He has excellent timelines on the theme of an alternative space race.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/red-star-a-soviet-lunar-landing.306694/
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/2001-a-space-time-odyssey.311629/
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/2001-a-space-time-odyssey-version-2.347087/
Request - do not kill Gagarin (although if the union falls apart or reshuffled in modern China, you can .... at least it's worse than death).
Postscript - in the Russian chocolate, cocoa beans are even lower.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

The diverse and widely-spread nations of the South Pacific spent many of the post-war years under the continued rule of various colonial administrations. Whilst superficially the situation was "back to normal" after the defeat of the Japanese, in practice the Pacific War had changed the region forever. Much of Pasifika was exposed to modern industrial technology, goods and alternative methods of governance and organisation which disturbed the traditional tribal way of life of the indigenous peoples.

Of the three major Pacific island subregions (Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia), Melanesia experienced the most turbulent post-war history. The Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS), supported by the West, won it's independence from Indonesia and aligned itself with the Oceanian Treaty Organisation (OTO), joining the collective security community in 1955, to the outrage of Indonesia and later Revolutionary Nusantara, which denounced the RMS as an "ersatz national liberation movement cobbled together by a conspiracy of feudal rulers and international financial interests". The South Moluccan economy largely revolves around the extraction of relatively high-value natural resource extraction: cloves and nutmeg, a cornerstone of the local economy since the colonial period (where the region was known as the 'Spice Islands'), continued to be extracted. Fishing, pearl diving and lobster harvesting also constitute significant sectors of the economy, along with logging of ironwood, teak and ebony for use in the production of luxury furniture. With a high proportion of military-trained males, well-known for their martial skill, South Maluku also earned notoriety as a significant source nation for mercenaries, serving throughout the Pasifika region and beyond.

Self-administration in West Papua, then known as Netherlands New Guinea, was first established in 1960, and incrementally expanded to include more duties until 1975, where West Papuan independence was dated to coincide with the independence of Papua New Guinea. Whilst there was some discussion about the possibility of uniting West Papua with Papua New Guinea, in practice such plans were not seriously pursued, largely as a result of divergences dating back to the colonial administration. In the years following Indonesian independence (and accelerating after the Communist seizure of power in Indonesia), the Dutch engaged in mass resettlement of Indos (people of mixed European and Indonesian, primarily Javan and Sundanese descent) in the West Papuan coastal regions. The relatively affluent and educated Indos rapidly dominated business and administrative life in the territory (also assimilating many ethnic Chinese). After independence, West Papua struggled to maintain a balance between the Indo-dominated commercial and bureaucratic spheres, and the Papuan-dominated military and political sectors. Whilst some progress has been made over time, this de facto social segregation has persisted, contrasting with the more cosmopolitan Papua New Guinea. West Papua maintained the constitutional monarchy after independence, retaining Queen Juliana of the Netherlands as Queen of West Papua.

Papua New Guinea, the site of prolonged contention between the Japanese and Australian forces during WWII, remained under Australian administration until 1975. Whilst prospects for the maintenance of democracy appeared poor, Papua New Guinea surprised many commentators by dealing with political issues smoothly via the constitutional process. Part of this could be ascribed to the fact that political powerbases in the country were generally very small, and thus whilst the coalition governments which governed PNG were often shaky, there was no ability for any ambitious strongman to emerge and seize power. The biggest challenge to the fledgling nation was the unilateral declaration of independence of the island of Bougainville as the 'Republic of the North Solomons" a mere five days before Papua New Guinea was scheduled to achieve full sovereignty. The secessionist sentiment on the island was motivated by both cultural and economic concerns. The local "blackskins" considered themselves distinct from the Papuan "redskins" and balked at the idea that their destiny should be chosen by these "foreigners". The Roman Catholic Church, the most powerful organisation in the islands, endorsed the separatist move. Furthermore, the Papuan government derived a significant chunk of their income from the Panguna open mine on Bougainville, operated by Australian company Conzinc Rio Tinto. The locals received less than 1% of the revenue from the mine, which also caused significant ecological damage. Many Bougainvilleans had also been displaced by mining prospecting activities. The Republic of North Solomons was unrecognised by Australia and Papua New Guinea, and the leader of the secessionist movement, John Momis, entered into negotiations with the Papua New Guinean government, securing an agreement where Bougainville would be granted significant autonomy. Nevertheless, tension regarding the operation of the Panguna mine would flare again in the late 1980s.

The Panguna mine, source of the Bougainville conflicts​

In the Solomon Islands, local councils were established in the 1950s as a step towards eventual self-rule. By 1970 a constitution was introduced and elections were held. This constitution was contested and a new, more popular constitution was adopted in 1974. Full self-government was granted by the British in 1976, with independence following in 1978, although the British monarchy was retained.

The political landscape of the New Hebrides underwent a seismic shift after WWII. The experience of industrial goods and the stationing of American forces, as well as their (from the local perspective) rapid departure prompted the development of 'cargo cults', largely revolving around a messianic "John Frum" figure who would supposedly return and bring prosperity to the islanders. These cargo cults often developed into political movements, espousing 'self-help' philosophies and communal cooperation. Many of these movements sought the end of colonial rule, as the British and French had, in the natives' eyes, proved incapable of bringing the kind of prosperity that "John Frum" would bring. Whilst Britain sought to decolonise entirely after WWII, the French were more pugnacious in their desire to retain the New Hebrides as a colonial possession, largely due to fears that Hebridean independence would encourage agitation by New Caledonian natives, where a greater French settler population existed. The first political party in the country was established in the early 1970s, the New Hebrides National Party. Renamed the Vanua'aku Party in 1974, the party pushed for independence. In 1974, the Vanua'aku Party dispossessed foreign land and asset owners, who were compensated financially. Two rebellions occurred in the prelude to Hebridean independence, in Tanna and Espiritu Santo. Tanna had sought independence in 1974 as the Nation of Tanna, but was suppressed by the Anglo-French authorities. In 1980, there was another attempt at secession, with the declaration of the Tafea Nation, it's name derived from the initials of the five islands it sought to incorporate (Tanna, Aniwa, Futuna, Erromango and Aneityum). This prompted a stand-off between British and French troops, the former of which had been sent to reinstate the authority of the government, whilst the latter was present to protect the fledgling Tafea Nation. Whilst there was no deaths in the standoff, French paratroopers fired warning shots, with the British Scotsguardsmen coming close to returning fire. Eventually, the British Colonial Office backed down, allowing Tafea to gain independence, but the British government, as well as the Australian and New Zealand governments, refused to recognise Tafea [161]. In May 1980, the Nagriamel movement, led by Jimmy Stevens, declared an independent Republic of Vemerana on Espiritu Santo, the largest island in the Hebridean archipelago. Stevens was backed by private French interests and the Phoenix Foundation, an organisation of American libertarian businessmen who sought to create a haven in the South Pacific territory. France recognised Vemeranese independence on June 3rd, and on June 5th Vemeranese tribal chiefs elected French ambassador Philippe Allonneau "King of Vemerana", whilst Jimmy Stevens became Prime Minister. The capital, Luganville, was renamed Allonneauopolis. The Port-Vila government, lacking an army, requested assistance from Papua New Guinea to repress the rebellion, but the Papuans refused after it became known that the French had stationed a small force of Garde Mobile on Espiritu Santo [162]. Recognition for Vemerana and Tafea was limited to each other and France. The New Hebrides, renamed Vanuatu, was granted independence on 7th July 1978, although British and French presence remained until the secession of Tafea and Vemerana led to the expulsion of French influence from the remainder of the islands, with British (and later Australian) troops based in the remaining islands as a countermeasure to French intrigues.

Nagriamel supporters, Vemerana​

In 1946, New Caledonia had become an overseas territory, with French citizenship extended to all New Caledonians, regardless of ethnicity, by 1953. The 1969-1972 nickel boom saw an influx of Europeans and Polynesians, reducing the Melanesian majority to a plurality. By this time, pro-independence forces were becoming more organised. The largest pro-independence group was the Caledonian Union (UC), which had shifted from an autonomist group to a full-fledged nationalist organisation by the mid-1970s. The more radical, Marxist wing of the independence movement was the Party of Kanak Liberation (Palika). French authorities proved hostile to the independence movement, but allowed the UC to campaign whilst the Palika organisation was driven underground [163].

Fiji's future was from the beginning uncertain. In the prelude to independence, Indo-Fijians, descendants of Indians brought to the islands to harvest sugar, began to outnumber the native Fijians. Fearful of being dominated under a democratic system, many of the native chiefs agitated for a continuation of British rule. The British refused to stay, and sought to establish a sustainable political equilibrium through the formation of a bicameral parliament, with the Senate dominated by Fijian chiefs, whilst the House of Representatives would be composed of popularly-elected politicians, with quotas for Indians, Fijians, Rotumans and other groups.

---
[161] IOTL the French gave less support, and as such there was not a military stand-off.
[162] Similarly as in [161], although the French were in favour of Vemerana IOTL, they did not support them militarily. There were no French troops there IOTL, and the presence of Papuan troops dissuaded rebellion.
[163] IOTL the Palika organisation was active, but was not banned.

 

[Alexander the Average]

How much of that was OTL?

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

How much of that was OTL?

In OTL, South Maluku and West Papua are still, to this day, under Indonesian rule.

PNG was in OTL, other than the fact that they did land troops in Espiritu Santo in OTL.

Solomon Islands, Fiji and New Caledonia are largely OTL, except in OTL the Palika movement wasn't driven underground.

The revolts in Vanuatu existed IOTL, but weren't successful due to less committed French backing.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Relative to the fractious post-war experience of Melanesia, Micronesia's path of development was modest but placid. However, whilst conflict was virtually non-existent, the region did suffer from extensive nuclear testing by the British and American governments. In particular, the unprecedented destructive power of the H-bomb was tested in places such as Christmas Island and Bikini Atoll. The fallout from these tests would have an adverse effect on local populations, some (but not all) of whom were compensated by the US government.

Much of the region passed from Japanese to US administration under the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Most of this territory gained self-governance as the Federated States of Micronesia in 1979, although the Marshall Islands and Palau opted to become independent, whilst the Northern Mariana Islands became a US territory.

Between 1946 and 1958, the United States tested 67 nuclear weapons on the Marshall Islands alone. This included the 1952 "Ivy Mike" test, where the first H-bomb detonation was carried out, which annihilated the island of Elugelab. By 1956 the United States Atomic Energy Commission claimed that the Marshall Islands was the "most contaminated place in the world". After the Castle Bravo test, a US research project, "Project 4.1.", was established to observe the effect of radioactive fallout on human health. In 1979, self-governance was granted to the Marshall Islands.

The 'Ivy Mike' H-bomb test, Elugelab, 1952​

The Gilbert and Ellice Islands were also subject to H-bomb tests, with Christmas Island utilised by both the UK and US for that reason, throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Institutions of self-rule were established on Tarawa from about 1967. In 1974 a referendum determined that the Gilbert and Ellice Islands would become separate sovereign states. The Gilberts adopted the name Kiribati upon achieving self-rule in 1979, whilst the Ellice Islands were renamed Tuvalu.

Nauru was governed under a UN trusteeship from 1947, under joint administration by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Self-governance was granted in 1966, and independence in 1968. Relative to much of the Pacific, Nauru has maintained a relatively high standard of living, as a result of the nationalisation of the assets of the British Phosphate Commissioners. In 1970, control of the country's substantial phosphate reserves passed to the Nauru Phosphate Corporation.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

For the most part, the immediate post-war period in Polynesia was largely defined by shifts towards independent self-governance, particularly in the former British colonies.

The Cook Islands remained a NZ dependent territory until 1965, but afterwards became a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand. The Cook Islands' relations with the rest of the world were peaceful, with the only real point of friction being minor territorial disputes with the United States over the atolls Tongareva, Pukapuka, Manihiki and Rakahanga. These disputes were settled in 1980 after the ratification of a bilateral treaty between the Cook Islands and United States, where the latter relinquished claims over the disputed atolls.

Western Samoa was granted independence from New Zealand on 1st January 1962. The first Prime Minister of Samoa was paramount chief Fiame Mata'afa Faumuina Mulinu'u II. Western Samoa, or Samoa i Sisifo in the local tongue, became the first Polynesian people to gain sovereignty (although the Tongans had technically never ceded their sovereignty). In neighbouring American Samoa, which was technically an unorganised territory as there was no Organic Act passed for the territory, a constitution came into effect on July 1st 1967, making American Samoa de facto self-governing, although it is not consider as such by the United Nations. In 1970, Tonga's status as a protectorate ended, making it a fully-independent nation under King Tāufaʻāhau Tupou IV, who was the largest head of the state in the world, weighing a hefty 200 kilograms.

Tongan king Tupou IV​

Niue was governed as a New Zealand territory until the restoration of self-government in 1974 following a referendum where the Niueans selected self-government. There had been a degree of hostility to New Zealand administration after the controversial imprisonment of three young Niueans for the murder of Resident Commissioner Cecil Hector Watson Larsen, who had abused the locals and treated Niue as his own personal fief.

French Polynesia was not granted self-governance, but in 1946 the islands became a French overseas territory, and received partial autonomy in 1977. Separatist sentiment in Tahiti was stoked by nationalist leader Pouvanaa a Oopa. In October 1947, Pouvanaa founded his own political party, the Democratic Rally of the Tahitian People. Becoming the Vice President of the local government administration in 1958, Pouvanaa's party swept the local elections with slogans such as "Tahiti for the Tahitians; Frenchmen into the sea!". Pouvanaa accused the French administration of allowing the local economy to deteriorate, and successfully campaigned for the introduction of income tax on the island, in order to raise funds from the Chinese and French businessmen who dominated the local economy. This campaign was met by a strike by local business owners, and a riot in Papeete, during which the French Polynesian assembly was pelted with stones, forcing the repeal of the income tax. Soon after, Pouvanaa was charged with arson and sentenced to eight years in prison and fifteen years in exile in metropolitan France.

 

[Deleted member 100251]

I'm loving the TL so far! Great work.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

For more information on China see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-3#post-7786930
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-3#post-8485910
and
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-19#post-11088102

===

The Chinese experience of the 1970s was one of massive change. Moving away from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and towards a denunciation of Maoist policies (in deed, although not in rhetoric), the People's Republic of China began to align itself more and more with the rest of the socialist world. The rapprochement with the Soviet-led bloc was largely achieved by Hua Kuo-feng and his clique, which included such figures as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-k'ui and Wang Tung-hsing.

As Mao Tse-tung aged, he became in many ways a more mercurial ruler. Partially as a response to the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution, he became increasingly hostile to challenges to his authority. He considered himself responsible for many of China's achievements, including the detonation of China's first H-bomb in 1968 in Northern Gansu [164], the launch of the Dongfanghong ("the East is Red") satellite in 1970 and the commissioning of China's first nuclear submarines. Nevertheless, feeling a need to bolster national unity and silence the remnants of the ultra-leftist movements who had years before openly defied the government, Mao decided that it would be useful to utilise the more radical Red Guards in the liberation of Tibet [165]. In doing so, he believed that he could incorporate the feudalist Tibetans into the Great Chinese Proletarian Project, whilst also ensuring that a good number of the troublesome student activists could be done away with permanently. The invasion of Tibet commenced in the August of 1969, but was stalled as the autumn settled in and the mountainous terrain, paired with cold weather and Tibetan resistance, claimed a great number of lives. The situation deteriorated even more rapidly as Indian troops intervened in March 1970, bolstering the Tibetan forces and turning back the Chinese, who had advanced at a crawling pace throughout the campaign. As the Red Guards advanced along the long road from Bomi to Lhasa, they were routed by a vigorous Indo-Tibetan counterattack at Maizhokunggar, a mere 68 km east of Lhasa. Over the next few months, the Indian forces, supported by the Tibetans, recaptured most of the territory captured by the Chinese, with only Amdo remaining in Chinese hands. Some nationalist Tibetan and Indian figures considered the possibility of an attack into the Chinese Qinghai province, considered by many Tibetans to be an integral part of 'Greater Tibet'. However, the Chinese government claimed that the Red Guards had acted of their own volition, and that any attack on Chinese territory would be met with nuclear retaliation. As Indian troops advanced towards Amdo, they were halted by heavy resistance from Red Guard forces, assisted by Korean commandos. Indian warplanes also found themselves buzzed by PLAAF fighters as they approached the skies near the Tanggula pass, which separated Tibet from Qinghai. The Chinese, Indians and Tibetans started tripartite negotiations, which resulted in a recognition of Tibet's borders and the demilitarisation of Tibet north of the Nyenchen Tanglha mountain range.

Hua Kuo-feng, Chinese premier, 1978​

During the post-Cultural Revolution period, Mao became increasingly distant from government, noticing but intervening little in the power struggles occurring within the Chinese Communist Party, as various factions positioned themselves from the power struggle that would occur after Mao's death. These power struggles rose to a head after Mao's death in 1976, when the Gang of Four, composed of Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, theorist Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, literary critic Yao Wen-yüan and labour activist Wang Hung-wen attempted to seize power. Opposed by Mao's chosen successor Hua Kuo-feng and his supporters, the Gang of Four were deemed a "counter-revolutionary clique" and sentenced to extensive prison terms. The other force of opposition opposed to Hua Kuo-feng was the market reformist wing led by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who was killed in a house fire in 1976 [166].

Hua's clique immediately went upon reforming the Chinese model of socialism to correct the "regretful aberrations" of the Maoist period. This included major economic reform under the direction of Chen-yün and Li Hsien-nien. Li Hsien-nien promoted heavy industrial development along the Soviet model, including the adoption of Soviet cybernetic production practice, which was trialed in Dongbei steelmills with notable success. Chen-yun, meanwhile, encouraged the utilisation of price mechanisms in order to more accurately determine demand and thus increase the utility of production. Along with imitating Soviet cybernetic practice, Hua's clique, particularly Yeh Chien-ying, were instrumental in building rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which was governed by the Kosygin-Podgorny-Kirilenko triumvirate. Whilst tensions did exist over some foreign policy issues, particularly developments in Indochina, Burma and Indonesia, the Sino-Soviet Split was effectively healed. Whilst China could not by any means be considered a "puppet" or "satellite" of the Soviet Union, and there was an implicit understanding that the Chinese were the preeminent socialist state in the Asia Pacific region, this rapprochement still panicked the American foreign policy establishment, which hoped that the two socialist giants would remain divided.

---
[164] Historically this test was in Xinjiang, which is the East Turkestan Republic ITTL.
[165] Whilst Tibet was invaded much earlier IOTL, the damage sustained by the PRC against the Americans during the Chinese Civil War limited Chinese expansionism, although Taiwan was taken in the late 1950s.
[166] Deng Xiaoping, for those more familiar with hanyu pinyin than Wade-Giles. Best known as the architect of China's OTL market liberalisation policies.

 

[WotanArgead]

From the Baltic Sea to the Rice Fields Socialism is stronger!

 

[DarkLordPotter]

Damn. Did not know there was another Alternative Cold War TL.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Damn. Did not know there was another Alternative Cold War TL.

Yeah this one has been ongoing since 2013.

 

[WotanArgead]

[49] So the Soviets are pulled into supporting the Nagy movement, given that it has repudiated the whole "Austria-style neutral" goal that it had for pragmatic purposes. IOTL, Soviet intervention in Hungary ruined the Soviets' reputation with most European Communists, as they appeared to be imposing an unpopular system on a populace. This splintering caused the genesis of movements such as Eurocommunism. Whilst Western Communists will still have a different outlook than Eastern European Communists, this will be more cultural than oppositional/disassociative than in OTL.

Forgive me that I'm worried, but you can ask a question - Hungary is still in the OWT-CMEA?

I just argued with one comrade about the Hungarian uprising in 1968 and that's what he gave me
"After the revolution, Hungary was going to go over to the Americans and announced withdrawing from the agreements, requesting the assistance of the Americans from the very beginning, without waiting for negotiations." They were impossible: the Communist Party was defeated, and Nagy immediately fell into the arms of the West. And yes, "neutral Hungary" is good in the USSR for as long as it's good, it's the struggle of spheres of influence-the Cold War.Capitalist Hungary would be a blow in the back of the spread of socialism (and Khrushchev would be thrown off right away).

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Forgive me that I'm worried, but you can ask a question - Hungary is still in the OWT-CMEA?

I just argued with one comrade about the Hungarian uprising in 1968 and that's what he gave me
"After the revolution, Hungary was going to go over to the Americans and announced withdrawing from the agreements, requesting the assistance of the Americans from the very beginning, without waiting for negotiations." They were impossible: the Communist Party was defeated, and Nagy immediately fell into the arms of the West. And yes, "neutral Hungary" is good in the USSR for as long as it's good, it's the struggle of spheres of influence-the Cold War.Capitalist Hungary would be a blow in the back of the spread of socialism (and Khrushchev would be thrown off right away).

I'm not sure what you're referring to with the OWT-CMEA, but Hungary is still a member of the Eastern Bloc.

From what I've read, it doesn't at all seem like the Hungarian reformists were going to "go over to the Americans". Like the reformists in Poland at the same time, they were socialists, but chafed at the injustices of Stalinism. In regards to American support, that was more seeking Marshall Plan aid (which Stalin had barred the Hungarians, or any other Central-Eastern Europeans, from receiving. The hope for American military support only became a last-ditch hail Mary when it became clear that Khrushchev wouldn't accept the Hungarian Uprising.

By the way, the Hungarian Uprising was in 1956, and occurred about the same time as the Suez Crisis. The Czechoslovak Uprising was in 1968.

 

[WotanArgead]

I'm not sure what you're referring to with the OWT-CMEA, but Hungary is still a member of the Eastern Bloc.

Organization of the Warsaw Treaty. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Organization of the Warsaw Treaty. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Ah okay, just wasn't familiar with that particular acronym.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

For more information on Indochina, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-17#post-10989768
and
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-17#post-10999005

===

Having achieved regional dominance through military intervention in the neighbouring states of Laos and Kampuchea and the reunification of Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists spent the 1970s consolidating their power, both internally and amongst their client states. This would eventually culminate in a controversial regional integration policy. Several critics, amongst them their nominal allies the Chinese, considered Vietnamese hegemony over Kampuchea and Laos to constitute 'social imperialism'. By contrast, the Vietnamese saw themselves as liberators, disestablishing 'feudalism' and acting as the 'vanguard' for the construction of socialism in Indochina. The local view of the Vietnamese presence was often more complicated.

The seizure of Cambodia and the toppling of the Lon Nol government was met with outrage by the American and Thai representatives at the United Nations. The Soviet and Congolese delegations defended the Vietnamese particularly vigorously, although the Chinese were conspicuously silent on the issue. Whilst Vietnamese aggression towards Cambodia was clearly blatant expansionism, criticism was largely silenced with the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to his country. Sihanouk denounced Lon Nol and his rightist allies, entering into an alliance of convenience with the Vietnamese in order to retain his throne and his privileged position in the country. Aware of the high standing of the Prince in the eyes of his people, the Vietnamese sought to utilise Sihanouk to legitimate their occupation in the eyes of the Cambodian people. The Khmer Rouge, the local Communists, were installed into power, led by Nuon Chea, who revealed a new flag and renamed the country 'Democratic Kampuchea'. The leadership of the Khmer Rouge countered anti-Sihanouk sentiments, pushed by figures such as Saloth Sar, by claiming that Kampuchea was still in essence a feudal society and required the unity represented by the monarch to pursue "internal national liberation" and provide both legitimacy and stability to the new regime. "In our country, the peasant need not know the dialectic" said Chea, "he need only that the Prince know it, or at least follow it".

People's Republic of Kampuchea​

From the beginning, Kampuchea proved a problem for the Vietnamese. Whilst dependent on Hanoi, the Khmer Rouge noticeably chafed at their leash. Compared with the Pathet Lao, the Kampuchean Communists were downright rebellious, often openly contradicting and even disrespecting the Vietnamese in meetings between the Communist parties. Despite this fact, the Khmer Rouge leadership knew who their control depended on, and the more vocal and radical anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge such as Saloth Sar were sidelined within the Party[167]. Aside from being a political weak link for the Vietnamese, it was also an area of constant guerrilla warfare. Khmer nationalists, primarily from the Khmer Serei issarak continue to strike at Vietnamese occupation forces from the Thai border, where they received support from the Thais and Americans in the form of arms, food and training. In response to these attacks, the Vietnamese regularly engaged, with assistance from Kampuchean forces, in raids deep into Thai territory. Diplomatically, the Vietnamese dismissed these instances as cases of accidental 'hot pursuit' over the border by its forces, but Vietnamese persistence eventually resulted in skirmishes with Thai forces, who more often than not were ambushed or fired upon first by the Vietnamese. In response the Thais situated artillery in sites along the border. In a sense, some of these skirmishes illustrated the callousness of proxy conflicts during the Cold War, with the Thais training artillery on refugee camps inhabited by anti-Communist Khmers, knowing that the Vietnamese would be drawn to these camps as targets. The resulting barrages often killed more Khmers than Vietnamese. Recognising that these raids were both ineffective and risked escalation, and uncertain whether they would be able to decisively defeat the Thais should it come to all-out war, the Vietnamese changed their defense strategy in Kampuchea. Le Duc Anh, commander of the PAVN forces in Kampuchea, was architect of the K5 Plan, known in the West as the 'bamboo curtain'. The plan involved clearing long patches of tropical forest as well as slashing and uprooting tall vegetation in order to cut a 700km-long, 500m-wide swathe along the Kampuchean-Thai border, bristling with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines at a density of 3,000 mines/km of frontage. This solution was expensive and irritated local farmers, who were tasked with cutting down regrowth. Eventually, the local farmers were resettled in plots confiscated from landholders in other parts of the country, and prisoners were used to cut the regrowth. The K5 Plan, whilst ambitious, was largely ineffective. Constant maintenance proved a drain on resources and it failed to effectively deter Khmer guerrillas, who persistently found gaps along the 700km border. Nevertheless, there was little doubt that it would prove a formidable obstacle should the Thais attempt an offensive into Kampuchea[168].

Pathet Lao soldiers in Vientiane, 1973. At this point, Caltex had not operated that particular gas station for a few years​

In neighbouring Laos, the Communist takeover was followed by a period of severe repression. Whilst the Pathet Lao declared a moderate policy, pleasantly surprising much of the population, particularly the small professional and business classes, Souphanouvong, half-brother of Prince Phetxarat and leader of the Pathet Lao, soon went back on his word and demanded immediate change. Prince Souvanna Phouma, leader of the Neutralists and Prime Minister of Laos, resigned and King Sisavang Vatthana was forced to abdicate. The King and his immediate family would die in a re-education camp near the Vietnamese border. Souphanouvong became the figurehead President of the newly-declared Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), although the real power lay with Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane. The inception of the Pathet Lao regime saw the cessation of printing of non-Communist newspapers and a large-scale purge of the civil service, army and police. Thousands were sent to "reeducation camps" deep in the remote jungles of Laos. The professional and intellectual classes fled en masse, and anticommunist leader Vang Pao led thousands of his Hmong fighters and their families into Thailand. Those Hmong that remained were discriminated against severely, granted few of the relatively rudimentary rights of ordinary Lao citizens. Political power in the LPDR was concentrated in the hands of four men: Prime Minister and General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane; economics chief Nuhak Phumsavon; planning minister Sali Voykhamxao; and security chief Khamtai Siphandon. This small clique, with the acquiescence and assistance of the Vietnamese, monopolised governance of the LPDR. Unchallenged as leader of the LPDR, Kaysone introduced collectivisation of agriculture. All land was declared state property and farms were merged into cooperatives. Unlike in states like China however (and even Vietnam), there existed no real feudal landholder class in Laos. Most of the farmland in Laos was owned by smallholders, meaning that there was little benefit that could be gained from collectivisation at all. The productive farmland was also primarily situated in areas inhabited by the culturally-dominant Lowland Lao. The Pathet Lao had always relied not on the Lowland, but the Highland Lao for support. Thus most of the Lowland Lao farmers, who already had no particular loyalty to the Communists, were alienated by their land reform. Rebelling against collectivisation and rice procurement, many Lao farmers sold their crops at low prices in Thailand. As state procurements fell sharply in both volume and value, and with the cutoff of US aid being replaced by a mere trickle of Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese aid, shortages, unemployment and economic hardship emerged in the towns. Of even greater concern to the Pathet Lao regime, the royalist Lao National Revolutionary Front began to operate from bases in Thailand. In response, the Lao government began to restrict movement, institute tight censorship and curtail "decadent" activities such as cinema entertainment or nightlife. By 1977, recognising the failures of their repressive mode of governance, controls on movement were limited and agriculture was decollectivised.

In Vietnam itself, the Communists sought to institute a socialist system throughout the country. The newly-annexed south was gradually communised, although initially some degree of private enterprise was deemed necessary to maintain international trade. The Second Five Year Plan, from 1976 to 1980, set unrealistically high goals for the average annual growth rate of industry (set at 16 to 19%), agriculture (8 to 10%) and national income (13-14%). Development plans were to focus equally on both agricultural and industrial development, intended to allow Vietnam to bypass the capitalist stage of development. The influence of Trotskyist groups in southern Vietnam on this policy is disputed by historians. Whilst on the surface such a policy appears Trotskyist, not only had the Trotskyists been decimated in the immediate postwar period by the Viet Minh, but the DRV engaged in a purge of many 'left communist' Viet Cong groups, including Maoists and those that appeared to hold "Trotskyist ideas" (even though no group claimed affiliation with the Fourth International). Regardless, collectivisation and repossession of crops had a negative impact on economic development, which stagnated. With the death of Mao Tse-Tung and the rise of the Hua Kuo-feng clique in China, the Vietnamese, concerned with the developing Sino-Soviet Rapprochement, sought a means to permanently tighten its hold on Laos and Kampuchea, precluding any struggle with China over regional hegemony. In order to do so, Pham Van Dong resurrected Ho Chi Minh's idea of an "Indochinese Socialist Federation". In 1979, the Hue Declaration was announced, where Vietnamese, Laotian and Kampuchean leaders declared the Socialist Federation of Indochina (SFI), comprised of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (as the DRV was renamed in 1976), Democratic Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Each nation maintained their own head of state (for instance, Sihanouk in Kampuchea) and even their own armed forces, although they were all under the overall command of the Minister of Defence (always Vietnamese). The Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao became the Indochinese Communist Party-Kampuchea and Indochinese Communist Party-Laos respectively, but their operation stayed largely the same. The SFI was largely a project that limited the ability of the Kampuchean and Laotian elites to act independently of Hanoi, but ensured military, financial and diplomatic support from Vietnam to the elites of Kampuchea and Laos. In 1978, collectivisation in Vietnam began to be reversed, although it was maintained in Kampuchea into the 1980s.

A Laotian propaganda poster showing revolutionary women of Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam standing in solidarity, gazing towards a brighter future​

---
[167] I thought sidelining Pol Pot would be much better than doing something corny like killing him. I assume that in difference circumstances (i.e. where the Vietnam War didn't happen) that even though anti-Vietnamese sentiment will still be there in the Khmer Rouge (and Cambodian society in general), that the radicals like Pol Pot should be able to be sidelined. That goes double without Mao being able to poke his nose in too much.

[168] The K5 plan was done IOTL, and is the primary reason why the modern Thai-Cambodian border is one of the most heaviest-mined on the planet. Unfortunately a lot of people have been killed or disabled by unexploded ordinance and mines. IIRC more so in Cambodia than in Vietnam. Anyhow, ITTL the plan isn't abandoned as it was IOTL, due to the more permanent nature of Vietnamese presence.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

For more information on Pakistan (1960-1969), see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-22#post-11230254

===

Yahya Khan, final military leader of Pakistan, who saw the secession of Bangladesh​

The Pakistani defeat in the 1965-1967 Bharati-Pakistan War fundamentally destabilised the emerging political order in Pakistan. The military leaders of the country had been severely discredited by their failure to secure the borders of the fledgling nation. Ayub Khan was replaced by Yahya Khan, who had commanded the 7th Infantry Division in the Bharati-Pakistan War. Despite his incompetence as a military commander, he was promoted by Ayub Khan to Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army. Yahya Khan took the mantle of political leadership after Ayub Khan's fall from grace, but proved as incapable as a civilian politician as he had been as a general. He immediately placed the country under martial law, and became known for his alcoholism and whoring. Despite these personal and professional failings, he was expected by anti-Ayub political factions to transition effectively to a democracy. Already difficult enough, these challenges were compounded by the regional divide between East and West Pakistan, which was inflamed by an uncertain constitutional relationship between the two areas. Whilst East Pakistan was the larger of the two Pakistans in population size, and was more politically-united through representation by the Awami League, West Pakistan was the traditional seat of power and produced most of the Pakistani military and business elite. Yahya Khan responded to these challenges by abolishing the 'One Unit' system, which had abolished the provinces and caused unrest in the various regions since its introduction in 1955. He also made attempts to redress the regional imbalance, leading to the seizure of a greater number of seats in the National Assembly by the Awami League. Rather than appeasing the Bengalis, in fact this confirmed their accusations of prior political marginalisation, whilst threatening the West Pakistani representatives with legislative irrelevancy.

By 28th July 1969, Yahya had established a framework for a set of democratic elections to be held in December 1970. In the 1970 general election, the Awami League won a total mandate in East Pakistan, whilst the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto won a majority in all the provinces of West Pakistan. The Awami League won 160 seats, whilst the PPP secured 81 seats and the conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML) held 10. The fundamental split between the East and the West of the country was now unquestionable. The PPP and Awami League began bilateral negotiations in order to form a coalition government, but hit an impasse when Bhutto refused to endorse the 'Six Points' of the Awami League, which sought maximum devolution for East Pakistan, including a separate currency and an autonomous military force. Frustrated by the political deadlock, Yahya Khan ordered the commencement of Operation Searchlight in support of the PPP, which would involve the seizure of towns in East Pakistan and the eradication of political opposition. Yahya Khan is quoted himself as saying "kill three million of them [Bengalis] and the rest will eat out of our hands" at a conference in November 1971. Yahya Khan claimed that the operation was in response to the killing of 300 Biharis (West Pakistanis) in Chittagong in March 1971 by Bengali mobs. The overall commanders of the Pakistani military resigned in protest to the operation, which went ahead anyway. In the run-up to the operation, Bengali military forces were scattered and officers were put on leave or sent to less sensitive areas in order to ensure a greater likelihood of success. On 25 March, Operation Searchlight commenced. Pakistani special forces commandoes captured Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) almost immediately, and almost all of the League's leadership was captured by the 29th. The 22nd Baluch Regiment, which was charged with security near the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) HQ, subdued the largely disarmed and disorganised EPR remnants during the night of the 25th (most of the EPR units had been deployed near border posts). Pakistani forces then secured Dhaka University, killing unarmed students and professors, before moving on to Hindu areas, where troops continued killing innocents. The 2nd EPR wing began to counterattack on the 26th, but after some initial success, the Pakistanis were able to halt and then subdue the Bengali resistance in Dhaka. The attack on Dhaka was followed by the seizure of Chittagong. Despite outnumbering the Pakistanis, the Bengalis failed to take the offensive as a result of disagreements between the EPR commanding officers. The Pakistani Army and Navy mounted a joint attack on the city. Bengali organised resistance collapsed and thousands of civilians were slaughtered.

By the 10th of April, the Pakistani Army was in possession of Dhaka, Rangpur-Saidpur, Comilla, Chittagong and Khulna. They had lost control of Rajshahi, Sylhet, Pabna, Dinajpur, Mymenshing and Kushtia to the EPR. The brutality of the Pakistani army in Operation Searchlight and subsequent campaigns provoked strong opposition from the Bengalis, who flocked to the Mukti Bahini ('Freedom Fighters', MB), a Bengali guerrilla movement that sought to liberate East Pakistan from West Pakistani occupation. The Pakistanis were surprised at the stiff Bengali resistance, their dismissive attitude towards the Bengalis symptomatic of the racist views held of Bengalis by many West Pakistanis as spineless and submissive. Operation Searchlight also suffered from its ambitious scope, and the objective of pacification by April 10th was not achieved. Despite Pakistani control over the major cities and airfields, the inability of the Pakistani army to crush Bengali resistance would prove the catalyst for the eventual dissolution of Pakistan in its entirety. The scattered Bengali forces were left with few arms and supplies, despite having a large recruitment pool, and were ordered by Mukti Bahini leader M.A.G. Osmani to fight autonomously, whilst Awami League political leaders sought support from Bharatiya. As would be expected, the poorly-trained MB fighters were incapable of besting the Pakistani Army in conventional combat. They also proved rather ineffective at fighting guerrilla war, with their ambushes of Pakistani convoys doing little more than delaying the Pakistani advance, as West Pakistani units fanned out from the towns to seize large swathes of the countryside using aggressive hunter-killer air cavalry tactics. The Pakistani Army also mobilised a number of paramilitary formations, most notably the Razakars, largely composed of collaborationist Bengalis, who were often guilty of the more heinous atrocities against Bengali villages. Several Islamist militias also supported the Pakistani Army against the MB, but were of mixed effectiveness.

Mukti Bahini propaganda posters​

The Bengalis' saving grace came in the form of Bharati intervention. Whilst the Bharati government and the Awami League were strongly opposed ideologically, the Bharatis sought to weaken Pakistan and improve their international diplomatic position through the liberation of East Pakistan. The international community had become aware of the plight of the people of East Pakistan, and a number of benefit concerts were held to send badly-needed aid. The intervention was a propaganda coup for the Bharati government, which could dismiss claims of hostility towards Muslims through the intervention, as well as making a convincing claim that the Pakistani government has been more oppressive to the Muslims they are supposed to protect than the Bharati Hindu nationalists. Whilst such claims obscure the situation within Bharatiya itself, it nevertheless improved the view of Bharatiya in the West. Realising the undesirability of association with Yahya Khan's government, the United States cut ties with Pakistan and began developing a close relationship with the fiercely anti-Communist Bharati government which had been courting them for years. The intervention itself occurred after a preemptive strike was launched by Pakistani Air Force warplanes on Bharati Air Force bases in December 1971. Bharati units, including troops which had participated in the Tibetan campaigns, poured into East Pakistan, overrunning the country with the support of auxiliary MB units. The Bharatis largely bypassed fortified areas, surrounding them and forcing the Pakistani forces into a surrender, which was signed on the 16th. Most of the United Nations voted in favour of the recognition of the new nation of Bangladesh, although this was vetoed by the Chinese, who still maintained a close relationship with Pakistan.

With the surrender of East Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh, the position of Yahya Khan back in Pakistan became untenable. Street demonstrations by outraged citizens became commonplace, and rumours abounded in Karachi of an imminent coup d'etat against Yahya Khan. In order to prevent further unrest, Yahya Khan handed the reins of power over to PPP leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on December 20th 1971. Pakistan was facing a political crisis unlike it had ever faced before. Emboldened by Bangladesh's independence, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi nationalists began to push for their own states. With the very existence of the country at stake, Bhutto began a military crackdown against separatists. Bhutto embarked on an ambitious reform programme, promulgating a new constitution in 1973 and engaging on economic reform driven by nationalisations and improvement of conditions for workers. Unfortunately, the nationalisations didn't operate as effectively as expected, largely because many of the nationalised businesses were too small to be effectively operated as state enterprises. His education policy was controversial: whilst he established thousands of new schools, he also abandoned Western education in favour of solely domestically-produced academic materials. A particular obsession of Bhutto's was with physics, which he strongly promoted as a means to produce the intellectual resources necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, a priority that became more urgent after the detonation of Bharatiya's first atomic weapon in 1974, the so-called "Parashurama" test. Bhutto also began to articulate a programme for land reform, which was to empower the Sindhi masses, despite upsetting the feudal landowners. He was toppled from power before this programme could achieve significant results. Irritated at America's abandonment of Pakistan, Bhutto turned to the Soviet Union as an alternative superpower patron. The Soviets, eager to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean, participated in a number of development projects, including the establishment of Pakistan Steel Mills in 1972 and the construction of Port Qasim in Karachi.

Suppressing separatist movements still remained, however, the primary concern for Bhutto and his government. Rising unrest in Balochistan province in the country's southwest had prompted Bhutto to dismiss two provincial governments within two months, arrest to Balochistani chief ministers, two governors and dozens of parliamentarians. He also banned the National Awami Party, which had significant support within Balochistan, and charged everyone with high treason to be trialled before a court stacked with handpicked judges loyal to Bhutto. As a result of Baloch outrage with these actions, the insurgency lead by tribal sardars (chiefs) began to intensify. In response, Bhutto ordered the military to suppress the Baloch nationalists in January 1973. A month later, an arms cache was discovered in the UAR embassy in Karachi[169]. The Pakistan Navy began a blockade of the Balochistani coast, intercepting UAR attempts to smuggle arms. However, they proved unable to prevent aid trickling down from Afghanistan to the Baloch tribal warriors. Wary of the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan supporting the Baloch separatists in Iran, the Shah also providing air support for the Pakistani Air Force. The two air forces pummeled the mountain hideouts of the Baloch fighters. Nevertheless, the Baloch kept fighting until they were granted independence in the wake of Pakistan's collapse. In the North-West Frontier Province, the situation was more complicated. Whilst Pashtun nationalists fought for an independent Pashtunistan, their co-ethnics in the Afghan government would provide only limited support. This was largely as a result of internal security issues caused by the support of Islamist mujahideen such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud by Bhutto's government. Nevertheless, as this support began to wither up with Pakistan's fall, the Afghans would take advantage of the situation wholeheartedly.

Sher Mohammad Marri (in sunglasses) and some of his Baloch guerrillas​

Concerned with the increasing Soviet presence in Pakistan, the CIA and US State Department officials began to make encouraging overtures to Bharati leaders. With the death of M.S. Golwalkar in 1973 and his succession by Balasaheb Deoras, the relationship between the United States and Bharatiya strengthened rapidly. Deoras agreed to an attack on Pakistan, which was to result in the annihilation of Pakistan and the fall of the Bhutto government, in return for generous aid grants, a favourable trade relationship, and the assertion of Bharati dominance over Sindh, the most economically-valuable part of Pakistan. On 5 June 1975, two years to the day after M.S. Golwalkar passed away, Bharati troops crossed the border into Pakistan. Falsely claiming that Bhutto was the patron of the numerous Communist insurgencies active within Bharatiya, Deoras had ordered a full-scale invasion. Denounced by many of the nations of the UN, but supported by the United States, the invasion brushed aside Pakistani resistance. Attacking along three axes, the Bharati forces, armed with heavy artillery, tanks and US-made warplanes such as the F-4 Phantom II, overwhelmed the Pakistani forces at every part of the front. The Pakistani tank forces were gutted in the Thal Desert as the Bharatis made the most of their air superiority after annihilating Pakistan's small interceptor force of Shenyang J-6s. A smaller central column pushed through the Cholistan desert, whilst the most powerful thrust pushed south and seized Karachi. The Pakistani Navy was bettered in a number of sorties by the Bharati Navy, and a blockade was instituted. Within two weeks the Bharati forces were in control of the majority of the country. Baloch tribals seized Gwadar and even Quetta, whilst Daoud Khan participated in a small, undeclared war, sending in Afghan troops disguised as tribal fighters, taking a page out of Pakistan's own playbook in the 1947-9 war. These troops, with assistance from local, authentic tribal warriors, occupied Peshawar and proclaimed the 'State of Pashtunistan'. Bhutto and his government escaped to Aden, where they were initially determined not to surrender. However, after some time, Bhutto caved, and signed an instrument of surrender. Deoras announced the dissolution of Pakistan, announcing that no longer would the peoples of the area be shackled to such an artificial concept of nationhood. The independence of Balochistan and Pashtunistan was confirmed. A mere month later, after a loya jirga in Peshawar, Pashtunistan committed to union with Afghanistan. The incorporation was complete by September. Balochistan was given independence as a constitutional monarchy, with the Bharatis demanding that the last Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmedzai, sought be named Khan of Balochs. This was intended to counteract the influence of the leftist Baloch politician Khair Bakhsh Marri and Marxist guerrilla leader Sher Mohammad Marri. This coalition would remain uneasy but stable through the rest of the 1970s, as Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmedzai kept largely aloof from politics, except to step in as a moderating influence. Of the post-Pakistani states, the only one to arise not out of an armed struggle, but purely out of a domestic politic movement was Sindhudesh. Sindhudesh arised out of nationalist agitation in Sindh province as a result of the dominance of the Punjabi and incoming Urdu-speaking Muhajir peoples who had fled India during partition. Feeling marginalised in their own home province, Sindhi nationalists flocked around G.M. Syed, who positioned himself as the preeminent Sindhi nationalist intellectual, proposing an independent Sindhi homeland in 1972. Publishing books with titles such as Now Pakistan Should Disintegrate and Sindhu Desh - A Nation in Chains, and establishing an independence organisation, the Jeay Sindh Mahaz (JSM), Syed would become known as the 'father of the nation' once he became the President of Sindhudesh after his installation by the Bharatis. The extent to which he facilitated Bharati domination of the Sindhi economy would prove controversial in later histories, with arguments over whether or not he was their willing patron, or that he simply recognised his vulnerability vis-a-vis the Bharatis and sought to appease them for the sake of his own people. Nevertheless, he engendered criticism in his failure to even attempt to break the power of the Sindhi aristocracy, who became the primary agents of Bharati imperialism, according to Marxist historiography.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh's 'father of the nation'​

After being released from captivity by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the aftermath of Yahya Khan's downfall, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman assumed the provisional presidency of Bangladesh and became the country's first Prime Minister. The MB and other militias were combined to form the Bangladeshi Army, which took over protection of the nation from Indian forces after their withdrawal. Despite the avowed secularism of the Awami League and the Bangladeshi government, Mujib began to move closer to political Islam as a means to shore up his support, aware that the Communists on the far left were opposed to his rule. Mujib declared a common amnesty to shore up his support amongst the Islamic right, aware that many of the Bengalis who had fought on the Pakistani side had done so out of pan-Islamist sentiment. Mujib had the provisional parliament draft a new constitution, which incorporated the fundamental principles of "nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism", which would be referred to amongst Bangladeshis as "Mujibism". Mujib commenced widespread nationalisation, whilst pushing through land reform intended to bring millions of tenant farmers out of abject poverty. He also initiated nationwide education, sanitation and infrastructure programmes to modernise the country. Proclaiming a constitution in 1973, and holding elections shortly thereafter, Mujib won a sweeping victory and the Awami League remained in power. The Awami League government continued to tackle the severe challenges facing the ravaged country, including attempts to provide homes for 10 million refugees displaced during the Liberation War, as well as combating the 1974 famine, which killed 27,000[170]. Mujib managed to build a constructive relationship with both superpowers, and received generous aid from Eastern European, Japan and the UAR. Partially as a result of these policies, and partially out of dissatisfaction with the government's response to the 1974 famine, a Maoist offshoot of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (the Awami League's student wing), known as the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal ('National Socialist Party', JSD) began an armed insurrection. The JSD's armed wing, the Gonobahini ('People's Army), attempted an attack on the Home Minister Mansur Ali's residence, which was repulsed. They then held a major rally blockading the residence. Stirring the crowd into a frenzy, the JSD engaged in street battles with riot police. The Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (RB), which was formed as a government death squad to counter the JSD, arrived on the scene and began to fire live bullets into the crowd, resulting in the 1974 Ramna Massacre, killing at least 40 protestors, many of whom were lying on the ground already. Faced with this brutal response, the JSD was driven underground, where it remained an insignificant political force. The only legal political force in Bangladesh was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BaKSAL), which was comprised of the Awami League, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the National Awami Party and the Jatiyo League after the fourth amendment of the Bangladeshi Constitution in June 1975. Despite this monopolisation of the political party system, Mujib's government started to suffer from dissatisfaction with his nepotism, preoccupation with national over local problems, and what was generally seen as a lack of political leadership brought on by post-liberation complacency. The industries which he had nationalised were performing poorly, and the expensive social programmes introduced could not be supported by a dwindling economic base. The Rakkhi Bahini, who had immunity from prosecution, engaged in widespread killing of political opponents. The RB has been accused of killing as many as 40,000 dissenters. Facing growing opposition, Mujib declared martial law in late 1974.

On 15th August 1975, Mujib was assassinated in a CIA-backed coup led by junior military officers and headed by Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, a colleague and friend who had become disillusioned with Mujib. Ahmad became President of Bangladesh and purged much of the senior pro-Mujib leadership, but was himself overthrown by a coup on November 6th by Khaled Mosharraf and Shafaat Jamil. A day later, Mosharraf was killed by a mutiny of left-wing non-enlisted personnel led by JSD leader Abu Taher. Col. Jamil was arrested by the mutineers. On the same day, a group of army personnel from the 2nd Artillery rescued Ziaur Rahman (Zia) from the mutineers. Ziaur Rahman was reinstated as chief of the army. At this point, army discipline had all but disappeared, and Zia recognised the need for a firm response to maintain discipline in the Bangladeshi Army and suppress the JSD mutiny. With the forces at his disposal, Zia cracked down on the JSD, arresting Abu Taher and other JSD leaders. Abu Taher was sentenced to death and executed in 1976, whilst other leaders were given lengthy prison terms. Zia managed to bring a semblance of stability to the country and embarked on an ambitious reform programme oriented around rural development, decentralisation, self-reliance and free markets. Without antagonising Bharatiya, he began to move away from its orbit, forging ties with the United States and the Islamic world, including both the UAR and the pro-Western monarchies such as Iran, Libya and Morocco, as well as the Turkish Republic. Zia began a mild Islamicisation campaign, promoting Islam and drifting further away from secularism. By promoting Islam, he brought into the fold of Bangladeshi nationalism a number of non-Bengali ethnic groups, but this had the negative effect of alienating the Hindu Bengali community.


---
[169] IOTL such a cache was allegedly discovered in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. Whilst it is impossible to be certain of the veracity of this claim, the Pakistani government stated that the Iraqis were seeking to assist in the creation of an independent Balochistan that would also cause trouble for their main rival, Iran. This doesn't seem unreasonable, and as Iran is the UAR's primary rival ITTL, I'm transferring that logic to this situation.

[170] IOTL, it killed 30,000, with such a high toll blamed by Mujib on the United States, which criticised US restrictions on food shipments to Dhaka as a result of Bangladesh's sale of jute to Cuba. Without the embargo in place ITTL, there is no need for such a policy, and the food shipments should save a few thousand people.

 

[TheInnerMoon]

Haven't read the latest update yet, but going by the footnotes, you missed numbers 167 and 168 on the Indochina update. Other than that, eager to hear more about kosybernetics and the space race

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Haven't read the latest update yet, but going by the footnotes, you missed numbers 167 and 168 on the Indochina update. Other than that, eager to hear more about kosybernetics and the space race

Literally as soon as you posted this I updated the footnotes on Indochina!

 

[TheInnerMoon]

Literally as soon as you posted this I updated the footnotes on Indochina!

I'll make sure to not be immediately critical then next time