The long and restive months between the Battle of Baltimore and January, 1862, proved to be tortuous and difficult for President Lincoln. Baltimore had been retaken, but Washington remained in enemy hands. Since the Union could not even retake its capital, prospects for taking the rebel one seemed dim. McDowell, overwhelmed with his duties as commander of the Army of the Susquehanna, seemed unable or unwilling to actually use the army and go on the offensive. His general in-chief, Winfield Scott, remained steadfast against a hard war. He did not have the energy to pursue one anyway, due to his age and poor health. If the war had been only a contest between armies, the situation would not have been so worrying. But it was more than that – it was a war between peoples, one where political factors were more than mere abstractions, but constituted actual realities that had to be taken into account. Each month that passed without action, each inconclusive probing attack, all eroded support for the war and the morale of the Union.
These realities caused several problems for Lincoln in the political sphere. Since the US was a Democratic Republic with a strong tradition of military subordination to the civilian authorities, the election of commanders and their actions could not be separated from public opinion or the democratic process. This helps to explain why McDowell was not pressured into attacking. Lincoln believed that, with the rebels disorganized, McDowell could push on forward and destroy Beauregard’s army, thus ending the rebellion with a swift blow. But the general felt that his men were in no condition to continue. He may have had a point: most of them were exhausted due to the difficult and bloody fight. But the rebels were just as tired, and more demoralized to boot. An undertone of reproach colored McDowell’s reply, for he believed that Lincoln pressuring him into attacking before he was ready was to blame for the heavy casualties.
In any case, Lincoln for the moment was inclined to defer to professional military men. He was no military expert, that is certain. Neither was he some kind of genius, at least not when it came to learning and applying information. That is something people close to him recognized. Some people may be able to read a book and two and immediately grasp its meaning. But Lincoln needed to read it again and again to fully comprehend it. His greatest virtue in this regard was that he did not stop until he completely dominated the subject. “He was not a quick study but a thorough one,” in the words of McPherson. He had taught himself how to be a lawyer; now, he was determined to teach himself how to be a Commander in-chief. Lincoln burned the night oil in many occasions, reading books on military theory and analyzing maps.
He needed that studying, for he truly did not have much counsel. Precedent might be expected to shed some light on what he needed to do, but in truth it was not very useful. The Revolutionary War provided motivation to the masses and ideals to follow; but Lincoln could not follow the example of Washington. He had to quell a rebellion, not lead one to victory. The precedent of Madison in 1812 and Polk in 1846 were more promising. However, Madison had lost, or at the most achieved a tie. In the Civil War, a tie would be paramount to a Southern victory. How war was conducted had changed, anyway.
John Hay, one of Lincoln's two private secretaries, testified to the President's intensive study of the ilitary situation
As for Polk, a Supreme Court ruling had disposed that the President could use the armed forces “in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.” This was somewhat vague, mostly because it did not clearly delimit the President’s war powers. Besides, Polk’s challenge was not as great as Lincoln’s –subjugating the rebels would be much more difficult than defeating weak and divided Mexico had been. For better or for worse, Lincoln himself would have to define the national strategy and help develop the tactics necessary to achieve it.
Soon enough, he developed his own conception of war, coming to the conclusion that the Union and the Constitution had to be preserved at all hazards, even if that meant, paradoxically enough, stretching the letter or even outright violating the Constitution. One must not, however, go as far as Conservative opponents did and dismiss Lincoln as a tyrant with no regard for the Constitution. He recognized that some of his actions did not have “any authority of law” yet believed that they were necessary, for he was forced “to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it with all its blessings for the present age and for posterity.” At times, Lincoln had to use the justification of “war powers” to skip Constitutional restrictions, all in order to save the Union and the Constitution itself.
These actions generated much controversy then, and continue to be controversial even today. Besides the well-known judicial challenges, they became a rallying point for opponents of the administration. The virtual destruction of the Democratic Party was beneficial, for it meant that no effective opposition party existed in the first months of the war. This allowed Lincoln to focus on the military situation, which, lamentably, did not seem very promising.
Lincoln sought to reorganize and reinvigorate the Army of the Susquehanna following Baltimore. Butler was too important as a politician to simply dismiss, and he enjoyed some radical support thanks to his “contraband” policy. Thus, he was placed in command at Baltimore. To replace him, the popular McClellan was brought from the valleys of Kanawha to Annapolis. People who were dissatisfied with McDowell were quick to rally to him, and McClellan welcomed the move, for he believed that he ought to command the Army of the Susquehanna.
“I already see the main causes of our failure to follow on our recent successes—I am sure that I can remedy these and am confident that I can lead these armies of men to victory once more. I start tomorrow very early on a tour through the lines.” Though McClellan’s arrogance and his at times petulant belief that he was superior to all the men around him brought problems for the Union in the future, his self-confidence seemed justified during those months. An excellent organizer who often worked for 16 hours straight, he energetically and ably transformed the men of Annapolis from "a mere collection of regiments cowering on a small Peninsula" to a fine army. McClellan’s success seemed greater when compared with McDowell’s own meager results.
It wasn’t that McDowell was a bad commander. It’s just that he couldn’t match McClellan’s energy, passion and charisma. While McClellan’s men adored him and were ready to go and “carry this thing 'en grand' & crush the rebels in one campaign”, McDowell’s seemed depressed and weary. It also seems that McDowell simply had bad luck, and no skill at forging relations or playing politics; McClellan, on the other hand, had airs of a “man of destiny”, as a contemporary observed, and he was as good at building up political support as he was at building up armies.
McClellan would eventually develop a fanatic and very loyal following among the enlisted men
McClellan’s first objective, rather than Stonewall Jackson’s gray-backs, seemed to be his own commander – McDowell. He criticized him, saying that “that villain, perfect at obstructing and delaying and nothing else” was the only thing preventing the destruction of the rebel army. Yet, ironically, McClellan also demanded thousands of men more to defend Annapolis, for he believed that Beauregard had triple his numbers and was preparing to crush him. McDowell couldn’t supply the men, so McClellan promptly charged that he was “condemning my gallant command to extermination by a foe clearly superior in numbers.”
However, the person who gathered the greatest criticism was General Scott. McClellan did not criticize him as openly, but he still disrespected him in other ways. Old Fuss and Feathers felt specially insulted when McClellan bypassed him (and McDowell for that matter) and offered a dazzling, if slightly unrealistic, plan to crush the rebellion. The plan greatly pleased Lincoln, for it fitted his view that the Union should use its superior numbers to attack several points at once and stretch the Confederates thin to the point of breaking. Using a backwoods metaphor, he compared the strategy with a man who can swat a wasp away, but would be defenseless if the entire nest attacked him. But McClellan’s plan did not involve a single nest – it required twice the number of men the Union had either trained or in training, and as a result it was not seriously considered for the moment.
But the fact that Lincoln listened to McClellan points to his growing disenchantment with Scott and McDowell. McDowell, the victor of Baltimore, was untouchable for the moment. Scott had laurels as large as his, but those were earned in a bygone era. McClellan was not the only one criticizing him, for Republicans in Congress also demanded a change in command. McDowell, though he respected Scott, was also disillusioned with him. Lincoln had come to believe that he needed a shake-up in the command if he was to win the war. Scott himself would welcome the change, since he was “unable to ride in the saddle, or to walk, by reason of dropsy in my feet and legs, and paralysis in the small of the back”, as he himself recognized. So, when he requested a leave of absence for motives of health (a resignation for all practical purposes) in October, Lincoln was tempted to accept it but ultimately persuaded Scott to remain because he had no replacement at hand.
McDowell seemed to be the natural choice for a new General in-chief, but he believed that the duties of that post combined with those he already had as commander of the Army of the Susquehanna would be too much, and Lincoln agreed. McClellan was presented as an option, but the Young Napoleon, unlike McDowell, believed that he could do it all and wanted to command for the Army of the Susquehanna and be General in-chief, and was not willing to settle for just one of those posts. There was also the fact that Scott opposed naming McClellan as his successor, partly out of personal dislike. Scott instead recommended Henry W. Halleck.
Called “Old Brains” due to his powerful intellect and his domed forehead, Halleck was renowned as an expert strategist. He had written the highly respected Elements of Military Arts and Science, a book which incorporated many elements of Jominian thought, the doctrine that dominated the strategy of many Civil War commanders. Pauchy and irritable, Halleck could not match McClellan’s charisma, but he had similar talents for administration and the training of armies. At the start of the war he was in California, but he was quickly commissioned as a major general, the fourth in rank after McDowell, Frémont and McClellan. At first it seemed like he was going to get command of the Missouri Department, but when Lyon got the post instead, he went to the East and assumed a command in the Army of the Susquehanna. There, he showed his administrative prowess, earning the admiration of the press, McDowell, and of the President. After discussing the matter with his cabinet, Lincoln decided to accept Scott’s resignation on October 27th, and appointed Halleck as the new General in-chief.
Halleck’s appointments raised the hopes many held for a victory before the Army was forced into winter quarters. Practically everybody already knew that McDowell did not have any big offensive planned. That “everybody” included, much to Lincoln’s chagrin, the rebels, who were free to rest and regroup. Under Beauregard’s direction, the defenses at the Patapsco and around Annapolis had been strengthened, and batteries planted in the rivers.
McDowell had not been completely inactive, however. Decided to prevent another bloody fight, he had drafted plans for a feint to be conducted against the position at Sweetser’s Bridge. The rebels would be forced to shift troops to that area, to the east of their main position. Afterwards, the feint would be followed by an all-out attack at the Annapolis defenses, which McDowell correctly identified as the weak link in the Southern defenses. Once McClellan’s army was free from its “corking” (as Lincoln had dubbed it), it would be free to attack the rear of the Confederates, who were expected to be at Elkridge’s Landing, contesting the Union crossing. The rest of the Union force would then attack at Ellicott’s Mills, and cross the Patapsco after brushing aside the (hopefully weakened) rebel force.
If successful, the plan would trap the main Confederate army, with the Chesapeake to its east, and Union forces to its north, west and south. It would decisively destroy the rebels and open the way to Washington. If Beauregard refused the bait and kept most of his men at Ellicott’s Mills, McDowell would still be able to get a large part of his force south of the Patapsco. Then he could attack at Ellicott’s Mills, pinning the Southerners there, and the force that had crossed could attack Beauregard’s rear. To prevent that Beauregard could withdraw, but he would find his way blocked by McClellan, who would have broken out of Annapolis by then. Either way, the plan seemed to secure either the destruction of the rebels or their inglorious retreat. But McDowell insisted on thoroughly preparing for the attack first. In the meantime, minor actions were conducted.
The first of these took place in the small village of New Market, east of the Unionist capital of Maryland, Frederick. Though Patterson had failed to pin the troops there back during the Baltimore campaign, the Southerners started to grow anxious and planned to move behind the Bush Creek, concentrating their forces behind a more defensible line. Union troops moved forward to discover that the “big cannons” there were actually painted logs. These “Quaker guns”, called like that because they were as threatening as the members of that pacifist religious sect, caused great embarrassment within the Union ranks. But it also made them realize that many of the batteries in the Patapsco might be Quaker Guns too.
An action took place on November 7th, when McDowell asked McClellan to probe the Annapolis defenses to test whether he would be able to break them when the time came. But McClellan failed, just like Butler had before him. It seems that the failure can be owed mostly to McClellan’s timidity, but newspapers and public opinion seemed more willing to believe McClellan’s denunciations that McDowell and Halleck had failed to provide him with enough men. The attack did have a positive consequence – for the rebels. The accolades Jackson received for repealing a second attack got Johnston’s attention. He concluded that McClellan was too timid, and that they could make better use of Jackson by employing him in the Patapsco, something that suited him better than playing defense.
The lack of action caused the Northern press to be waspish and recriminatory. The Susquehanna River was not in the front lines, but the popular impression was that McDowell was simply sitting on his hands in Havre de Grace, without doing anything to advance the Union cause. Thus, the bitter saying “All quiet along the Susquehanna” came to be. A congressman expressed the people’s frustration when he demanded “Action! Action is what we want and must have.”
Even if the Army was not conducting any maneuvers during those last months of 1861, the politicians were. The main target was the inefficient and often corrupt Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. In his report of October 8th, 1861, which Lincoln had requested in order to determine whether he should replace Scott or not, Cameron had endorsed the enlistment of Black soldiers. Some have, as a result, interpreted his stepping down in middle December as a punishment for radicalism. But the truth is deceptively simple: Cameron was a bad administrator, and the War Department under him languished with corruption and inefficiency.
Cameron himself seemed to realize that he was way over his head. At first, he felt insulted, characterizing the dismissal as “personal degradation.” Nevertheless, after Lincoln had phrased the offer more tactfully, he accepted. Cameron followed Lincoln’s suggestion to frame the dismissal as him stepping down to the more comfortable post of Minister to Russia, so as to preserve his reputation. But Radicals in Congress were still dissatisfied with the move, and their dissatisfaction came at a bad moment for the Congressional session of December 1861 would treat several critical matters related to slavery.
To replace Cameron, Lincoln selected Edwin M. Stanton. Years ago, after Lincoln was elected as a Senator but before he would assume his new office, the important case of McCormick v. Manny was held in Cincinnati. Stanton, as a brilliant up and coming lawyer was contracted by Manny’s defense attorneys. Lincoln had been previously contracted when the case was going to held in Chicago; they neglected to tell him of the change of venue or to tell him that his services were no longer required. When Lincoln showed up at Cincinnati, he was rudely spurned and ignored by Stanton and the rest of the lawyers, who simply did not acknowledge his presence.
One of Lincoln’s greatest qualities as a statesman was his ability to see past slights like those. Others would be unwilling to move on; Lincoln would forgive if the good of the country required it. And so, despite Stanton’s difficult personality and his well-known criticism of the President, he was appointed as the new Secretary of War. Seward and Chase may have played a part. Chase’s role was obvious enough, for he and Stanton were friends and Chase believed that he would be a good ally. Seward, for his part, fondly remembered that Stanton had provided assistance as a Washington insider during Buchanan’s months as a lame-duck. Stanton had refused to serve in Buchanan’s cabinet, for he could still not accept the admission of Kansas as a slave state, but the intelligence he provided to Seward was very valuable, even if Seward’s maneuvers were ultimately unsuccessful.
Just 47 years old, Stanton's long bear made him appear older
Stanton was efficient, energetic and incorruptible, as well as rude and brusque. But contractors accustomed to selling diseased horses or faulty weapons needed someone like him. Stanton brought to the War Department the same kind of energy that he brought to trials. “He puts his whole soul into any cause he espouses,” an observer said, “he toils for his client with as much industry as if his case was his own…as if his own life depended upon the issue.” Thanks to the new secretary, the War Department started to hum like a well-oiled machine, giving McDowell and Halleck the supplies they needed to build up their armies.
But whether they would use those armies remained to be seen. The months tickled by, and still no attack came. And so, the Army of the Susquehanna went into winter quarters. They hadn’t fought any battle since Baltimore, and Washington was still in the hands of the enemy. The new year was fast approaching, and Lincoln still had many woes. The lack of action and bickering of his generals was one, of course, but the actions of the Radical Republicans in Congress and the conservative reaction occupied most of his attention in December. And there was still the specter of foreign recognition, since the European Powers had not failed to notice that the Union seemed powerless and weak, its capital still occupied by its foes. Lincoln needed action and victories, especially in the East, but everything remained All Quiet along the Susquehanna during those trying months of the winter of 1861-1862.
