1940 Campaign in the West

[chris N]

There are many what ifs to the German campaign in the West in 1940. One thing is what if Hitler and the commander of the Germany Army forces that were advancing on Dunkirk had not given the order to halt. Instead the German panzers and infantry had kept up the pressure and as a result the British and French were unable to evacuate anywhere near the amount of forces from Dunkirk. In effect no Miracle of Dunkirk. Perhaps a few thousand men were saved.
What would the effect be on the course of the War.
Norway and the invasion had brought down the government of Neville Chamberlain and only by the thinest of margins was the Great wartime leader Winston Churchill able to overcome Lord Halifax and become Prime Minister.
But now in June of 1940 the Germans had managed to capture nearly 300,000 British toops and score the greatest defeat ever suffered by the Empire. The British Public was stunned by the loss and it is likely that there would be an immediate call to bring back the remaining BEF forces in France as quick as possible.
Churchill being the man that he was would try to convince the Parliament and the Nation to continue the war.
However let us say that he suffered a loss of confidence vote in the Parliament and the Tories turn to Lord Halifax to form a new government of National unity to replace the one lead by Churchill.
It is likely that Halifax would propose sending out peace feelers to Hitler, something that the German leader would be overjoyed to accept.
British forces are pulled out of France as the French government collapses and Petain takes power.
Italy has waited too long to declare war and gets no reward.

It is highly likely that with no threat in the west Hitler will turn to the east. Mussolini would be told not to make any trouble in the Balkans and the German army shifts to the East to carry out the invasion that will hopefully destroy the Communist state to the east.

Despite the Brilliant victory in the west there are Generals and officers who have there doubts about a war against the Soviet Union. Some have read reports of the Winter War between Finland and Russia and others recall the bitter campaign in the First World War. The Furher seems to think that it will be a piece of cake and an easy victory but the Abwehr has presented evidence that the Soviets have many more tanks than the Germans and with heavier guns. Still the War is to be started in May of 1941.
The only thing that the Germans have going for them is no second front. Churchill has returned to the Admirality.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

*sighs and pulls out the bingo chart*

 

[chris N]

Germany seemed to be heading into another war. This one would be bloodier than any of the other campaigns fought. If anything Hitler was over confident. There were some in Germany that wondered as to when would Germany's luck run out. There was a small group of Germans that were horrified at the direction the German people were being taken. As the time ticked by German industry produced more weapons and the industrial might of the captured European states was being used to produce trucks and weapons for Operation Barbarossa.

 

[chris N]

The Campaign of 1940 had seen a German victory in Denmark and a really close call in Norway. Even some of the German Generals could not believe how much luck played a part.
If the Belgians had had more forces in the Ardenness things might have gone a whole different way. The German breakthrough in the Sedan was another stroke of luck. If the French had retained their highly mobile force in France rather than sending then toward the Netherlands the war might still be going on. If the halt order had not been withdrawn the British and the French might have been able to escape the trap and Germany might face a two front war.
The French were hard to understand. They repeatedly made mistakes and the recalling of Petain from Spain was perhaps the greatest. Rather than strengthen the will to fight he reinforced the idea that the war was lost.

 

[Saphroneth]

It always amazes me how this kind of thing is "all or nothing". No possibility that, say, the Brits evacuate one-third or two-thirds of historical. No chance that they have some of their force get away, as opposed to nearly all.
It's almost as if the general understanding is that the Germans just stood back and let them load a third of a million men.
They most certainly did not, and there's a grave somewhere in France with my great-uncle to prove it - he died as part of the rearguard.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

It always amazes me how this kind of thing is "all or nothing". No possibility that, say, the Brits evacuate one-third or two-thirds of historical. No chance that they have some of their force get away, as opposed to nearly all.
It's almost as if the general understanding is that the Germans just stood back and let them load a third of a million men.
They most certainly did not, and there's a grave somewhere in France with my great-uncle to prove it - he died as part of the rearguard.

You make a very good point here, OTL the Luftwaffe was only able to devote it's entire strength to Dunkirk from 1st June onwards due to other commitments and the weather, the assumption has to be that the evacuation would continue to this point provided Dunkirk is not captured on the ground. In all likelihood no "Stop" order would provoke the Brits into throwing up a smaller defence zone. There would be fewer troops evacuated, the evacuation would be shorter but there would be some troops rescued, plus of course those evacuated from other parts of France and the Low Countries and those recently returned and returning from Norway. These add up to a considerable amount of men.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You make a very good point here, OTL the Luftwaffe was only able to devote it's entire strength to Dunkirk from 1st June onwards due to other commitments and the weather, the assumption has to be that the evacuation would continue to this point provided Dunkirk is not captured on the ground. In all likelihood no "Stop" order would provoke the Brits into throwing up a smaller defence zone. There would be fewer troops evacuated, the evacuation would be shorter but there would be some troops rescued, plus of course those evacuated from other parts of France and the Low Countries and those recently returned and returning from Norway. These add up to a considerable amount of men.

We recently went over this, no Stop order means the 1st Panzer gets there days before the Brits do; the French had a mangled reservist division in the way, but no Allied troops near Dunkirk otherwise, which itself was only 15km away from the front on the night of the 24th when the Halt Order was in effect.

The British were too far away from the other ports in Belgium to reach in time before the Belgians surrendered, so without Dunkirk there is no evacuation at all.

Now the Norwegian evacuation and other evacs from France would help, but the vast majority of troops evacuated from France outside of Dunkirk were non-combat LOC troops, most of whom were effectively civilians from private industry mobilized to handle British supply lines.

 

[chris N]

Let me return to the campaign of 1940 and the possibility of changes that might very well have altered the outcome of the campaign. It would seem that one possible change that would have altered the campaign seriously was if the French High command had decided to retain its most mobile force in reserve rather than sending it to advance rapidly to the Dutch Border. Thus this force would have been available to blunt the German thrust and if not stop it delay it until additional forces could be moved up or the allies withdraw closer to the French border.
Then there is the Question of the 51st Highland Division, which was separated from the Main BEF force. Might it not been more advisable to have pulled it back and used it with LOC forces much earlier.

 

[Redbeard]

Seen from GB in mid 1940 the evacuation of course was seen as a kind of miracle (covering up a much bigger disaster) and was utilised as such in propaganda.

But short of some kind of political panic, which allways should be taken deadly serious, I don't see why the British should quit. The troops evacuated in 1940 didn't come back as useful combat formations and a defence against invasion in 1940 first of all was based on keeping airsuperiority and control over the Channel.

I'm not one of those saying that Sea Lion would be total ASB, but it certainly wasn't likely to be succesful and after BoB it's chances were even more reduced.

But of course the build up of the British army will be slower lacking the old army lost in France. I guess a slightly less aggressive stance in North Africa, Greece etc., but not much of a loss compared to OTL.

I might even have a slight hope, that less influence from the old pre war army with all its arrogance, regimental traditions and interarms ignorance might produce a better army?

 

[chris N]

Looking at the possible loss of most of the BEF it would seem that someone would be blamed for the possible loss of nearly 300,000 troops. There is little doubt that General Gort would get a lot of the blame but it is also likely that Churchill would face a loss of Confidence vote.
If Churchill lost that vote it seems like that Lord Halifax would most probably be selected to replace Churchill. Halifax was know to favor peace with Germany so it is probable that Britain might exit the war provided that favorable term could be reached.
Any major mistake by Germany with regard to Britain could Bring Britain back into the war such as an Italian Invasion of Egypt or Greece and Germany getting involved.
Most likely not to happen as Hitler would be furious with Mussolini for possibly restarting a war that he had ended.

 

[chris N]

As for Sea Lion I also believe that it is possible If the Luftwaffe won control of the skies. Would it be successful that is another question. German losses would be horrible and there would be no possibility of a German invasion of Russia in 1941. There Might even be a coup attempt.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

We recently went over this, no Stop order means the 1st Panzer gets there days before the Brits do; the French had a mangled reservist division in the way, but no Allied troops near Dunkirk otherwise, which itself was only 15km away from the front on the night of the 24th when the Halt Order was in effect.

Yeah, we did recently go over this. And that is not accurate at all.

With that being said, let me clarify that I could perfectly well see a German assault on Dunkirk on the 24th being successful. I could also perfectly well see it failing. This is one of those cases where it's not a sure-fire thing either way. For a TL like this where Dunkirk falling is a necessary set-up, I don't at all mind.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Yeah, we did recently go over this. And that is not accurate at all.

With that being said, let me clarify that I could perfectly well see a German assault on Dunkirk on the 24th being successful. I could also perfectly well see it failing. This is one of those cases where it's not a sure-fire thing either way. For a TL like this where Dunkirk falling is a necessary set-up, I don't at all mind.

Posting your counterpoints out of context isn't exactly disproving what I said on that thread.

 

[chris N]

It would seem that the French reaction to the German invasion lead to a series of mistakes that just began to pile on top of one another.
The French Arm'ys Commander in Chief was finally beginning to repond to the offensive and set the wheels in motion for a response when a decision was made to recall the French Commander from the Middle East and have him replace the army's commander. This immediately put the brakes on plans.
Also why the 51st Highland Division was allowed to remain on the Maginot line instead of immediately recalled to help form a strike force to protect the BEF rear as it began to retreat is puzzling.

 

[oldironside]

The French Arm'ys Commander in Chief was finally beginning to repond to the offensive and set the wheels in motion for a response when a decision was made to recall the French Commander from the Middle East and have him replace the army's commander. This immediately put the brakes on plans.

It's always struck me as an interesting POD - What if Gamelin had been sacked 24 hours later? As it is, Weygand cancelled the offensive and then wasted time touring the ministries in Paris before ordering essentially the same attack again 48 hours later. By then, of course, it was too late.

 

[Saphroneth]

Posting your counterpoints out of context isn't exactly disproving what I said on that thread.

And you didn't reply. The thread ends with ON's second point.

 

[chris N]

Yes it does seem to me that if General Gamelin had held his post for another 48 hours things might have worked out far better for the French. General Weygand came in and stopped the attack while he went on a tour of the front. This gave the Germans the time that they needed to ensure that their breech of the front was stable.
Time at this point was not on the allied side. Action was needed and the failure to do anything just made things worse.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

It would seem that the French reaction to the German invasion lead to a series of mistakes that just began to pile on top of one another.
The French Arm'ys Commander in Chief was finally beginning to repond to the offensive and set the wheels in motion for a response when a decision was made to recall the French Commander from the Middle East and have him replace the army's commander. This immediately put the brakes on plans.
...

It's always struck me as an interesting POD - What if Gamelin had been sacked 24 hours later? As it is, Weygand cancelled the offensive and then wasted time touring the ministries in Paris before ordering essentially the same attack again 48 hours later. By then, of course, it was too late.

Yes it does seem to me that if General Gamelin had held his post for another 48 hours things might have worked out far better for the French. General Weygand came in and stopped the attack while he went on a tour of the front. This gave the Germans the time that they needed to ensure that their breech of the front was stable.
Time at this point was not on the allied side. Action was needed and the failure to do anything just made things worse.

My take is the Allies were screwed by that point. There were a lot decisions that might have saved them, but certainly by the end 16th May it was too late. Perhaps even decisions made on the 14th doomed the Allies.

Gamelins actions when he grandly intervened were far too late & divorced from reality. The armies he had organized and trained and commanders he had recommended during the last six years had already failed & any orders frm his ivory tower were hardly going to undo all his previous work. Had the preparation been appropriate it would have been unnecessary for Gamelin to give a single order after the morning of 10 May.

 

[chris N]

Perhaps the biggest problem was the fact that the French Defense Minister played politics by blocking the Premiers desire to have a new commander of the French Military before the invasion started. It would seem that most of the French commanders were too old and too prepared to fight the last war rather than the one that they were faced with. There were some exceptions to this as Gen. Charles De Gaul proved capable of modern warfare in 1940.

 

[Shaby]

Perhaps the biggest problem was the fact that the French Defense Minister played politics by blocking the Premiers desire to have a new commander of the French Military before the invasion started. It would seem that most of the French commanders were too old and too prepared to fight the last war rather than the one that they were faced with.

The French doctrine was based and shaped upon their experience of the previous war. The French GQG asked themselves what would be expected of them in case the Germans stirred up trouble again? Unlike the Germans, they came up with the that the defense was their primary mission in a new war. So they did what they thought was the best way to carry out this mission.

There were some exceptions to this as Gen. Charles De Gaul proved capable of modern warfare in 1940.

He was more excpetion, than the rule. Furthermore, he was colonel in 1940, not general, IIRC.

On topic of Dunkirk evacuation, I believe the British were frankly surprised they managed to evacuate BEF at all. They were psychologically fully prepared to lose the entire army. Their best case projection was that 80.000 would be evacuated. So why, exactly, would the fact that their expectations were realized, would they panic to the point they change the second government in less than a month, when the guilt for this event could not be ascribed to Churchill?

Please note that the loss of men would in no way impact the British ground operations (such as they were) until second half of 1941. Compass would still go as it did. In fact only in second half of 1941 did the British transfer any men to NA. They did transfer the equipment, but that was all lost in Dunkirk anyway.