Have you heard about the Bird?
Air mobility became an issue in the United States with the development of the concept of parachute air assault in the 1940s. This work continued despite air-landing and air-assault during WWII into the post-war era. Air landing and air assault units were recognised as elite light infantry capable of diverse fragile actions to achieve corps and army level operational outcomes such as supported opposed sea landings or critical carpet laying for dense terrain combined operations advance such as in the successful "Market Garden" operation by the British. In the context of the price paid by the British for strategic success, and the economic outcomes of employing fragile elite units for high risk high reward results, the Americans did not, however, listen.
With the West of Suez declaration by the British in 1958, the "Emergency" ceased being an issue for British Imperialism, and became, rather, an issue for the Free World facing Communist insurgency. The unification of plane droppable, plane assault, and heliportable units into 1 Air-Dragoons was a natural response by the United States to the complex post-war environment and the real issues of anti-communist insurgency warfare as a secondary theatre of operations, other than the most important German Plains theatre. To this end 1 Air-Dragoons was deployed to Kenya.
This is when I am going to need you all to shut the fuck up about 1972, the bombing campaign, hot autumn, the school lunches issue in California and the national guard deployments. Some of you are going to be California National Guard. Some of you are going to be Panthers. Keep it in your fucking pocket.
US involvement in Kenya was controversial and does divide the American public to this day. The ulcer of the actions undertaken in Kenya weeps like the man standing guard on POWMIA stickers on trucks. But I want to concentrate strictly on how the 1 Air-Dragoons, including their horse artillery, managed to stand in Mobassa against communist assaults. 50% casualties normally renders a unit inoperative. But with the elite status, and the support from 81 mm and 105 mm air-mobile horse artillery the Dragoons managed to stand, hold, and maintain. The later loss of Mombassa was an operational decision from the Free World Kenyan Government and US forces in theatre, not a deficiency of Dragoon combat effectiveness. The Mombassa kill ratios speak for themselves, and the failure of Mau Mau forces to dislodge the Dragoons from Mombassa speaks to what elite units, even elite units comprised of conscripts, can do.
I know this will be a difficult topic for many of you, particularly given the "home front" issues of the Kenyan War, but please concentrate your attention to how US forces managed to deploy and operate a primarily helicopter bourne force in 1961 in Africa.
yours,
Sam R.
Air mobility became an issue in the United States with the development of the concept of parachute air assault in the 1940s. This work continued despite air-landing and air-assault during WWII into the post-war era. Air landing and air assault units were recognised as elite light infantry capable of diverse fragile actions to achieve corps and army level operational outcomes such as supported opposed sea landings or critical carpet laying for dense terrain combined operations advance such as in the successful "Market Garden" operation by the British. In the context of the price paid by the British for strategic success, and the economic outcomes of employing fragile elite units for high risk high reward results, the Americans did not, however, listen.
With the West of Suez declaration by the British in 1958, the "Emergency" ceased being an issue for British Imperialism, and became, rather, an issue for the Free World facing Communist insurgency. The unification of plane droppable, plane assault, and heliportable units into 1 Air-Dragoons was a natural response by the United States to the complex post-war environment and the real issues of anti-communist insurgency warfare as a secondary theatre of operations, other than the most important German Plains theatre. To this end 1 Air-Dragoons was deployed to Kenya.
This is when I am going to need you all to shut the fuck up about 1972, the bombing campaign, hot autumn, the school lunches issue in California and the national guard deployments. Some of you are going to be California National Guard. Some of you are going to be Panthers. Keep it in your fucking pocket.
US involvement in Kenya was controversial and does divide the American public to this day. The ulcer of the actions undertaken in Kenya weeps like the man standing guard on POWMIA stickers on trucks. But I want to concentrate strictly on how the 1 Air-Dragoons, including their horse artillery, managed to stand in Mobassa against communist assaults. 50% casualties normally renders a unit inoperative. But with the elite status, and the support from 81 mm and 105 mm air-mobile horse artillery the Dragoons managed to stand, hold, and maintain. The later loss of Mombassa was an operational decision from the Free World Kenyan Government and US forces in theatre, not a deficiency of Dragoon combat effectiveness. The Mombassa kill ratios speak for themselves, and the failure of Mau Mau forces to dislodge the Dragoons from Mombassa speaks to what elite units, even elite units comprised of conscripts, can do.
I know this will be a difficult topic for many of you, particularly given the "home front" issues of the Kenyan War, but please concentrate your attention to how US forces managed to deploy and operate a primarily helicopter bourne force in 1961 in Africa.
yours,
Sam R.