Thinking too small, mount wheels on the bottom of the ship, drive it up onto land, throw the food overboard!
- Status
Thinking too small, mount wheels on the bottom of the ship, drive it up onto land, throw the food overboard!
I goofed the math. To keep the troops fed until mid-1943 would take at least 10 runs. Anything the submarines can bring in helps too.
thorr97
Banned
The original war plan for the Japanese was to seize the DEI oil fields and as much territory as possible early on. From that point they'd force the Allies to grind away at those outposts and bleed them as much as possible in the process such that the weak and decadent Westerners would become so sick of the process that they'd accept a negotiated peace to end the war. That price of that peace would be that Japan would get to keep its oil access and be the dominant power in Asia. The US and the Brits could have their original colonial holdings back, of course.
To enact that strategy however, the Japanese had to get those oil fields in the first place. Getting them required expanding out through South East Asia and conquering the Philippines. In this ATL they've failed to do that. They've also failed to conquer quite so many of those barely above sea level at high tide atolls in the rest of the Pacific.
That means their entire original war plan has been rendered moot. They've no territorial holdings now with which to bleed the Westerners with in the retaking. And with the British still safely holding Singapore the Japanese position in the Philippines is now so horribly exposed as to be a constant liability.
The entire strategic objectives and purpose of taking the Philippines has now been rendered irrelevant by the strategic failures on other fronts of the Japanese attacks.
Taking and holding those individual islands served a useful purpose in OTL even as the Japanese knew they'd be cutoff. The Japanese didn't much plan of keeping them constantly supplied anyway. With the Philippines however, that's different. They have to keep the supplies constant as the troop levels there are too massive. If the Japanese presence in the Philippines was having some greater strategic effect then perhaps it would still be worth it but it isn't. There's no US Navy presence left in the islands. True, there's no land based American or Allied air power there either but there'd be little for that air power to threaten that isn't already in range of what's based out of Britain's continued holdings to the west.
Holding Bataan also isn't costing the US much in the way of strategic resources either. The Americans seem to be doing just fine even with access to Manila and the rest of the Philippine ports. And even without any offensives launched by the US or the Japanese troops in the Philippines it's still costing the Japanese dearly to remain there. The Japanese are losing troops due to illness as they're camped out in the field facing the Americans and the presence of those Japanese troops isn't being decisive there.
At this point, with the original war plan utterly shattered the Japanese would have to be looking for ways to respond to the new reality. That would involve some hard decisions but they've proven capable of that. And the reality of how costly it is in keeping the Philippine operation supported would have to be front and center in all this. At some point they'll recognize that the shipping loses alone are prohibitive and that the fuel consumption for the IJA is impossible to sustain as it's preventing the rest of the fleet from adequately meeting the US and RN threats.
The Japanese military, both the IJA and IJN, are too exposed in the Philippines now. Their presence there is gaining the Empire nothing while costing it irreplaceable troops, ships, supplies and fuel. This, while doing little - if anything - when it comes to halting or even hindering the Allied offensives against Japan.
Withdrawal then becomes a strategic imperative.
To enact that strategy however, the Japanese had to get those oil fields in the first place. Getting them required expanding out through South East Asia and conquering the Philippines. In this ATL they've failed to do that. They've also failed to conquer quite so many of those barely above sea level at high tide atolls in the rest of the Pacific.
That means their entire original war plan has been rendered moot. They've no territorial holdings now with which to bleed the Westerners with in the retaking. And with the British still safely holding Singapore the Japanese position in the Philippines is now so horribly exposed as to be a constant liability.
The entire strategic objectives and purpose of taking the Philippines has now been rendered irrelevant by the strategic failures on other fronts of the Japanese attacks.
Taking and holding those individual islands served a useful purpose in OTL even as the Japanese knew they'd be cutoff. The Japanese didn't much plan of keeping them constantly supplied anyway. With the Philippines however, that's different. They have to keep the supplies constant as the troop levels there are too massive. If the Japanese presence in the Philippines was having some greater strategic effect then perhaps it would still be worth it but it isn't. There's no US Navy presence left in the islands. True, there's no land based American or Allied air power there either but there'd be little for that air power to threaten that isn't already in range of what's based out of Britain's continued holdings to the west.
Holding Bataan also isn't costing the US much in the way of strategic resources either. The Americans seem to be doing just fine even with access to Manila and the rest of the Philippine ports. And even without any offensives launched by the US or the Japanese troops in the Philippines it's still costing the Japanese dearly to remain there. The Japanese are losing troops due to illness as they're camped out in the field facing the Americans and the presence of those Japanese troops isn't being decisive there.
At this point, with the original war plan utterly shattered the Japanese would have to be looking for ways to respond to the new reality. That would involve some hard decisions but they've proven capable of that. And the reality of how costly it is in keeping the Philippine operation supported would have to be front and center in all this. At some point they'll recognize that the shipping loses alone are prohibitive and that the fuel consumption for the IJA is impossible to sustain as it's preventing the rest of the fleet from adequately meeting the US and RN threats.
The Japanese military, both the IJA and IJN, are too exposed in the Philippines now. Their presence there is gaining the Empire nothing while costing it irreplaceable troops, ships, supplies and fuel. This, while doing little - if anything - when it comes to halting or even hindering the Allied offensives against Japan.
Withdrawal then becomes a strategic imperative.
In the June 1942 post the bataan quartermasters said they had food for a year for 71k men. In the July 1942 post they mentioned ammo for 9 days heavy fighting. In the October 26th post they were down to 63k men but ordered rations cut? Seems premature if they have sufficient to get them till June 1943. That's 7 months away. Ammo whittling down I can see but has something happened to the food supply?
Also while original plan orange was to take island bases in the central Pacific does anyone know if that plan foresaw use of allied bases in Australia Java and Singapore. No plan survives contact with the enemy and with supply to Australia secured via taking of Makin Tarawa Tulagi and Guadacanal it seems a new route would be in order. Either moving north from Australia to Ambon then eastern celebes before moving on to either Borneo or Davao as one option.
The route that seems best is taking Pontianak then moving to Singkawang and leap frogging along the northern coast of Borneo under cover of the airbases you build along with the mountains and jungle protecting from any land based counter attacks much like the landing at Empress Augusta bay on Bougainville. With the Commonwealth pushing the japanese out of Thailand you are turning the south china sea into an allied lake and cutting Japan off from the oil while simultaneously isolating their southern garrisons and getting closer to extending air cover to Bataan. 2nd Marines are in Java for something. Could be the taking of Bali mentioned in the October 25th post but just seems US would want something to be moving toward Bataan. The holding off Sumatra Java and Malaysia means you should be able to get your invasion fleet to Pontianak in a day and a half to cover the roughly 400 miles moving at 10 knots. Figure 1st 12 hours under cover of darkness leaves 12 hours of daylight to be discovered and attacked by air till 12 more hours of night before invasion begins in the morning. The Kido Butai in Truk is 1900 miles away roughly as the crow flies so at least 3 days at 20 knots to get in airstrike range. Allows for air support from Java and positioning of submarines for early warning and attrition along likely approaches for Kids Butai.
Also while original plan orange was to take island bases in the central Pacific does anyone know if that plan foresaw use of allied bases in Australia Java and Singapore. No plan survives contact with the enemy and with supply to Australia secured via taking of Makin Tarawa Tulagi and Guadacanal it seems a new route would be in order. Either moving north from Australia to Ambon then eastern celebes before moving on to either Borneo or Davao as one option.
The route that seems best is taking Pontianak then moving to Singkawang and leap frogging along the northern coast of Borneo under cover of the airbases you build along with the mountains and jungle protecting from any land based counter attacks much like the landing at Empress Augusta bay on Bougainville. With the Commonwealth pushing the japanese out of Thailand you are turning the south china sea into an allied lake and cutting Japan off from the oil while simultaneously isolating their southern garrisons and getting closer to extending air cover to Bataan. 2nd Marines are in Java for something. Could be the taking of Bali mentioned in the October 25th post but just seems US would want something to be moving toward Bataan. The holding off Sumatra Java and Malaysia means you should be able to get your invasion fleet to Pontianak in a day and a half to cover the roughly 400 miles moving at 10 knots. Figure 1st 12 hours under cover of darkness leaves 12 hours of daylight to be discovered and attacked by air till 12 more hours of night before invasion begins in the morning. The Kido Butai in Truk is 1900 miles away roughly as the crow flies so at least 3 days at 20 knots to get in airstrike range. Allows for air support from Java and positioning of submarines for early warning and attrition along likely approaches for Kids Butai.
The essential point is that there was nothing in the Philippines that Japan really needed. They wanted the oil and the rubber and the tin of the DEI and Malaya and Borneo. But if you were going to seize those, you needed to make sure your flanks were covered as it was a long way back to the home islands.
How confident were the Japanese that the USA would not throw a hissy fit if they attacked Malaya, Borneo and the DEI? Not very, given the Lend-Lease act and other pro-British actions by FDR and his administration.
So, plan on the worst case scenario. Attack DEI and Malaya and the USA decides to join in. How do you counter this? War Plan Orange had to be a given in any staff college planning. So occupy Island chains that will attrite the US Fleet as it heads to manila. Attack the Philippines and destroy their warfighting capability. Force the USN to steam west to relive the forces in the Philippines.
There is nothing in the Philippines Japan really, really needs. So what if the US/Filipino forces retreat to Bataan? A self supporting POW camp.
To be brutally honest, and speaking from a staff college POV, the Philippines were a nice to have but not essential for the Japanese. They were a magnet for the USN and other US forces that would attempt to relieve them. But Dug-out Doug stuffed it up from the start by sending the Bataan supplies to behind the invasion beaches rather than direct to Bataan, sacrificing months of rations and supplies to his own misguided idea of defense of the Philippines. The rest is history in OTL. The fact that they have managed to survive this long in TTL is both a plus, in that the Japanese do really need to resolve this for propaganda purposes and a minus in the USA as questions are being asked about why there is no plan to rescue these brave American boys.
formion
Banned
Where in Bataan is the frontline? Because the available agricultural land may make a difference. As we can see in the link below the east of the peninsula has some good agricultural land. Certainly in OTL there were rice paddies but I do not know their extent. Of course for any agricultural efforts, water buffalos are needed.
https://dbmp.philrice.gov.ph/soils/province/Bataan/property
Regarding harvesting time, this map shows that Bataan has 2 harvests per year https://www.flickr.com/photos/ricephotos/10924022186/in/photostream/
Lastly, in OTL were man-made fish-ponds on the eastern coast. However, I do not know their production during the siege.
https://dbmp.philrice.gov.ph/soils/province/Bataan/property
Regarding harvesting time, this map shows that Bataan has 2 harvests per year https://www.flickr.com/photos/ricephotos/10924022186/in/photostream/
Lastly, in OTL were man-made fish-ponds on the eastern coast. However, I do not know their production during the siege.
Please in-between TL updates, keep us updated on your weather predicament. How far away from the coast are you? Are you near to any streams, rivers that might overflow? How many storeys does the building you live in have? If you do evacuate - where to, with what facilities?
Yorktown and North Carolina are not floating, but in the mud. I don't know if either of them can float, or if they'd fill up.
If they can float, and break loose, that's not a good thing. There's a reason the navy has cleared all of its ships out of the bases under threat.
Driftless
Donor
I imagine the Coast Guard has a critical emergency set of roles.
What preparation does the Navy do for their onshore families in those areas (the other services too)?
It would be criminal to try and reinforce the Phillppines like shall we say leasing cows to water. Use as many subs as you can to keep the trickle of food meds and ammo fine but not ships it would be for the Japanese a shooting gallery. How ever now that the British have managed to get a grip in Malaya it should be able to free up some light units to go Japanese hunting not the combat ships but the supply vessels after all an army can not survive on bread alone. Small cuts maybe but each and every ship sunk will cost them dearly. Or thinking out of the box try and send in a couple of fast disposable freighters with Higgins boats attached unload like mad in the evening take the ships out of the channel first light and use the Higgins boats to unload untill spotted by the Japanese. No matter what there is no way that the Allies have if saving those poor sod over there.
Nope, nothing at all.
Having a secure rear area between Borneo and points south and Japan proper is and was clearly not an important factor.
Also the ports and airfields the Japanese control where never used or considered, be it OTL or here, to use for logistics support or staging for other invasions.
Oh wait.
Stay safe I was in the states when Katrina hit and vowed I’d never go any where that one of these bad boys can hit town. Watching my rented car float past as I with my wife sat on my sisters house was not pleasant. The Air National Guard picked us and the sister Familie up and boy those lads deserve all the praise ever given. The Guards men could not understand why I was laughing when they pulled me in I had to tell them that it was a lot better than going down the rop in Iraq as I had been doing a week before. Tell you what it made them laugh and for a small second gave them a small amount of relief.
- Status