1941, Friday 05 December;
“Mr President, I’m afraid I must speak again regarding the developing situation in the South China Sea. Our shared intelligence strongly suggests the Japanese have assembled an invasion force, which as we speak is sailing south, hugging the Indo-China coast. Our defence would be immeasurably improved if we were to pre-empt that by occupying Southern Thailand. Should Japan attack us and us alone, we would very much hope that the United States would provide armed support.”
“Prime Minister, Winston, if I may, should you find yourselves alone, at war with Japan, you can rest assured that I would do everything in my power to provide you with armed military support, but should you occupy part of neutral Thailand, and Japan not attack you, it would do significant harm to our united cause, and just maintaining what we have already achieved may be all we could do, even if Japan later attacked you alone.” And so, the Trans-Atlantic call had ended, but the conundrum it presented remained.
Churchill was later to write, never did I go to bed filled with more trepidation, than that night following the decision we had made in giving Gort and Phillips the authority to launch Bullring. Picador wasn’t so worrying, but Matador, well, the enormity of what we had invested into Gort’s care, was far more than any one man should be given, but the distance and time between us, meant any decision had to be made in theatre.
The concerns we had that Roosevelt wouldn’t be able to keep his spoken word, in supporting us, when the USA wasn’t even at war, the message that might go to the American public that we had attacked neutral, little Thailand, that we were war mongering colonialists worried me immensely. The idea that the Japanese were possibly playing us, with a mock invasion, was also very unsettling.
But on the other hand, to hand the initiative to the Japanese, and let them gain a firm foothold right at the opening of hostilities, placing us on an immensely bad footing, and potentially costing us, not just the loss of Malaya, but Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, was a situation we couldn’t countenance. It had been made clear to me by the Chiefs of Staff, that despite our best efforts, commitments in active theatres meant we couldn’t be anywhere near as strong in the Far East as we would have liked.
The latest assessment from the JIC was very clear
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1. Japan’s traditional step-by-step policy has now placed her with two naval bases in Southern Indo-China and two good aerodromes, with six others within some 350 miles of Northern Malaya. She is also favourably placed to take the next logical step: the establishment of similar bases in Thailand, which would threaten the security of Malaya even more severely.
2. They now have aircraft established in Southern Indo-China adequately supplied with fuel and bombs together with services and accommodation. They are now able to offer shore-based air support for any sea-borne expedition against Northern Malaya.
3. If the Japanese are permitted to occupy bases in Southern Thailand without military counter-measures, it has been estimated that they could build up a force of some four Divisions in the Songkhla – Pattani – Hat Yai areas within a few weeks. It has also been estimated that they have sufficient landing craft to put a maximum of three Divisions ashore at once.
4. If, on the other hand, we are able to forestall them in Southern Thailand, it is estimated that only one Division could be moved and maintained down the railway in face of air and sabotage attack. The three Divisions at sea would remain a threat.
Joint Intelligence Committee
Furthermore, special information, derived from the FECB code breakers, reading the Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, gave many clear indications of Japan’s intention, preparing them for a coming war with Britain. Whether the Americans would be attacked or not, they couldn’t say, but Britain would be.
I was comforted by the fact that Gort had the RAF and Army working well, in tandem, and that Phillips, and his Force Z fully understood the predicament, and that with Operation Picador, he would provide as much support as he could, such that, if we could provide Gort with such an advantage as Matador offered, at the opening of hostilities, that events might follow in our favour.
And with a likely Japanese invasion fleet at sea, we had to make a decision now, or not at all. The plans for Bullring were sound, the forces we could commit, the bare minimum, but the advantages were considerable. Militarily, the alternative was extremely poor, ceding the initiative, with incomplete defences, lengthen the odds against us holding Malaya. All three Chiefs of Staff supported both the Picador and Matador options from a military point of view. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Australia, John Curtin, whose troops made up the lion’s share of our Matador force, had been very vocal about the need to have no ambiguity about the decision-making process, a further pressure I didn’t need.
But the political view, opposed this, we had a non-aggression treaty with Thailand, and it didn’t sit well to break that, and even more so, would we be endangering the greatest prize of all, the USA joining us in the war. I had called the President earlier that day, perhaps in the hope that he might move a little on his stance, but the message was the same as had been said for a couple of months now.
And so, on that fateful day, Friday 5th December, 1941, at 11pm, in a late evening meeting with my Chiefs of Staff, at great risk to our relations with the USA, but firmly committed to the defence of Malaya and Singapore, we agreed to give them the authority to launch Bullring, with Gort, ultimately left with deciding Matador, provided he was sure Japan was going to attack us. The decision was coded and sent, and was in their hands by 3.30pm Singapore time. Needless to say I slept badly.