Chapter 5: March of the Brownshirts
“Hitler’s arrest was the most publicized event in German history to this day. You can still cheaply purchase century-old newspapers from the era reporting on the day it happened because of how many copies had been printed. The quickest rising nationalist in Germany had practically overnight gone tumbling down. The charges levied against him by the government included multiple ‘unconstitutional acts’ namely the inciting of political violence by way of the SA.
Hitler would have very easily been able to worm his way out of these charges, however. In later memoirs he would lament his sentence as being avoidable. He could absolutely prove he had no part in the putsch in Danzig, and his past crimes in which the SA played a large role could be definitely hand-waved if he could provide evidence of the benefit they’d brought to German public security.
That isn’t to say Hitler would have escaped prison. Even without the events that followed his arrest, the SA was still an organization responsible for extreme use of violence and civil disruption and would’ve likely been disbanded regardless, along with the Nazi party even had they not responded the way they did. However, Hitler could’ve still easily reorganized the Nazis under a different name, just as they had before, their operations would have been damaged, but not irreparable had the SA simply complied with their leader's arrest. But as we know, they did not.
- Republic of Weimar, by Franklin McAdoo
“The SA was in shock when the Police showed up at the
Gau headquarters in Berlin to arrest Hitler and several other Nazis. Many were still hopped up on the high provided by Forster's attempted putsch in Danzig. They reportedly attempted to heckle the Police officers arresting Hitler, only managing to succeed in breaking their own noses and a near-brawl in the middle of the street. But the seeds of discontent were already being sown. Some of the SA leadership decided to wait out the storm. See if Hitler would have any orders for them when or if he released a statement. However for a large portion of them. They chose not to wait at all.
Christian Weber was among those who attempted to rile up the SA after Hitler's arrest. Weber was a notorious Nazi, and despite having Hitler’s ear, was especially known for his personal corruption and desire for self-enrichment. Weber was one of the few left after the arrests were carried out, with most of the Nazi's heads, like Himmler, Hitler, Goebbels, and Rohm, all thrown in jail. Without waiting for a go-ahead and against the advice of his colleagues, Weber threw an impromptu rally in the middle of Berlin and demanded that the SA and SS mobilize a putsch to overthrow the supposedly corrupt government. While Weber would later defend himself as a ‘proud Hitlerite’ nowhere in his original speech, which was recorded by a sympathetic director whom he had paid off, did he advocate for his leader's release instead of stressing the time for a revolution against the Weimar.
Weber, a member of the old guard of the party, was successful in recreating the Beer Hall Putsch in which he had participated almost a decade prior. He gained support quickly in Berlin. The SA in Berlin quickly converged on the police station there. At 5:00 PM shots were heard being exchanged between the police and SA. By 7:00 PM, Article 48 had been enacted by the Reichstag. By 8:00 PM, shooting was echoing in the streets.”
- The Years of Anarchy: Germany from 1929-1932, by David Schmidt
Ҥ1 In the event of a State not fulfilling the obligations imposed upon it by the Reich Constitution or by the laws of the Reich, the president of the Reich may make use of the state police to compel it to do so.
§2 If public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered within the German Reich (defined in Paragraph 5), the president of the Reich may take measures necessary for their restoration, intervening if need be with the assistance of the armed forces. For this purpose, he may suspend for a pre-determined period, in part, the fundamental rights provided in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153. The period may be re-approved by the Reichstag if public order has not been restored by that point.
§3 The president of the Reich must first inform the Reichstag without delay before any and all measures are to be taken in accordance with Paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the Reichstag.
§4 If the same conditions as presented in Paragraph 2 are present, a State government may, for its own territory, take temporary measures as provided in Paragraph 2. These measures are to be revoked on the demand of the president of the Reich or of the Reichstag.
§5 Endangerment or disruption of public security and order is defined as acts that willingly violate the current laws of the Reich, especially laws pertaining to the use of political violence or violence of a political nature, thereby waiving the rights listed in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153.
[1]”
- The amended version of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, amended June 5th, 1928
“Many historians make out the ‘March of the Brownshirts’ as the true final putsch of early Weimar history. In an almost worryingly heroic-sounding story of the woefully out-matched SA attempting to take on the colossal giant that was Weimar Germany. Some go as far as to call out the Weimar government for its use of Article 48, despite making significant moves to have it reduced and, in the case of the SPD, outright removed only years prior. These founding myths of the far-right are not only argumentative fallacies, but historical ones as well.
The SA was not necessarily outmatched; there were hundreds of them in Berlin during the putsch, and their numbers, compared to that of the police, proved a sizeable threat. However, the march was not some glorious last stand for the SA, it was more like a dying gasp of breath for the whole movement. The SA had barely any guns between them and were woefully underprepared to take on the Police in Berlin, who were not only better trained, more experienced, and better armed. But also had predicted the SA response would not be one of calm moderation and had begun preparing for a violent civil disruption hours before the putsch happened, even warning nearby neighborhoods to vacate the area in fear of them getting caught in the crossfire. Even then, many would still die at the hands of the SA.
When the march began at around 5:00 in the afternoon, with the sun setting, the German police were out in droves at barricades and as soon as it became clear the SA intended violent action, shooting erupted. The president was not long after contacted by the chief of police who informed him of the violence in the streets. At this point, it is also important to note another myth perpetrated by the far-right of Germany. Which is that President Jarres had planned to lure the SA with Hitler's arrest as bait. While it is true Jarres intentionally did not suppress the Nazi demonstrations earlier in the day during Forster's putsch in Danzig, it is simply untrue that he needlessly continued to put lives on the line after the arrests had been carried out. Jarres was still a German chauvinist, and he belonged to a conservative party, the DVP. While they had distanced themselves from hardline nationalism, Jarres was a far cry from an anti-Nazi. He still thought that the SA would simply stand down after their leadership collapsed, and that miscalculation would still cost him the next election. For the time being, however, it gave ample reason for the Reichstag to support Article 48 being put into action.
Article 48, even after being amended by the Reichstag in 1928, was a controversial law. It presented the potential to be harmful to German democracy and, even in its revised state, created friction, most especially between the police and armed forces. The ‘NDR’ had attempted to put the old law back in place during the Constitutional Crisis, which is what actually led to the Armed Forces disobeying the order, and likely saving the German government from collapse. There is a case to be made that Article 48 would also unknowingly save the German government during the March of the Brownshirts; however, once again, this relies upon the narrative that the Brownshirts had any real chance of overthrowing the German government. There were firefights between them and the police, yes, and sporadic shootouts persisted until the morning. But the SA never had a chance against a well-prepared and cohesive force. The ‘March of the Brownshirts’ by the time it ended sometime around 7:00 in the morning on September 23rd, would only succeed in ensuring the end of the Nazi party.”
- The Brown & The Red: Fascism and Communism in Germany in the 20th Century, by Toni Greene
[1] Again, like with the economy thing from earlier chapters, I am REALLY bad with legal lingo. If anyone has better knowledge on this and could help edit, I’d be open to that, but the basics are just that the law is no longer as broadly sweeping in use, nor as centered around the president, nor does it give power to the Armed Forces but, instead to the Weimar police.